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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICS OF LABOR MILITANCY IN MINNEAPOLS, 1934‐1938
SEPTEMBER 2011
KRISTOFFER O. SMEMO, B.A., HAMLINE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Christian Appy
The militancy that helped prompt federal labor reform and the electoral
incorporation of industrial workers exposed serious political fault lines within the
so‐called New Deal coalition. In particular, militancy and factionalism in the labor
movement compromised the early electoral victories of the ruling Farmer‐Labor
Party in Minnesota and New Deal Democrats nationally. Yet the landslide victory of
Republican candidates in 1938 in Minnesota, as well as across the industrial North,
was not a repudiation of the New Deal or the labor movement. These Republicans
refashioned their party platform to accommodate key parts of the New Deal,
including recognizing the legitimacy of collective bargaining. Liberal Republicans
harnessed popular support New Deal social policy, but unlike Democrats they were
free to criticize the supposed “excesses” of the New Deal‐ namely a militant and
politicized labor movement. Minneapolis provides one case study to reconsider the
impact of labor militancy on the development of New Deal liberalism.
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CHAPTER 1
LABOR MILITANCY IN MINNEAPOLIS
Minneapolis isn’t like another city. Not like New York. It’s not cosmopolitan.
Nor it is like, say Detroit. Detroit is like a big company town‐ held down to
the belt and the sales talk. Minneapolis is far more varied and more
headstrong. Nor is it like Pittsburgh, which is crowded and smoky and tough
like the steel it makes. Nothing like Kansas City, which has tried to be like
Boston. Nor like Boston‐ St. Paul is proverbially the Boston of the Midwest.
Minneapolis is like none of them. And yet, it shares the American common
denominator with each of them.1
During the Great Depression a deep current of social conflict coursed through
every major US city and was, according to journalist Charles Walker, the “American
common denominator.” Minneapolis was no different. Waves of strikes and
protests throughout the 1930s wracked the city as unemployment skyrocketed and
employers slashed wages. In 1934, Minneapolis became one of the flashpoints of a
resurgent American labor movement. All too often, historians treat the bloody
Minneapolis trucking strikes of that year either as an isolated event or part of an
undifferentiated national trend of worker discontent. What these accounts typically
ignore are the politics of labor militancy. There is a deeper and more complicated
story beneath the trucking strikes that illuminates how significantly class struggle
during the Depression reshaped the contours of mid‐twentieth century American
politics.
The immediate political ramifications of labor militancy in Minneapolis were
multifold. The surge in labor militancy spurred by Section 7(a) of the National
Charles Rumford Walker, American City: A RankandFile History (New York: Farrar
and Rinehart, 1937), 1.
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Recovery Industrial Act of 1933 galvanized workers as a class in a diversity of
workplaces. In Minneapolis, working‐class protest took place in a unique political
context. Most notably, a social democratic Farmer‐Labor Party governed the state
and a cadre of revolutionary socialist Trotskyists led the resurgent Minneapolis
labor movement. The 1934 trucking strikes were therefore a tense moment when
competing ideas about how to challenge the power of capitalism collided. In the
wake of the trucking strikes, the Trotskyists hoped to translate their newfound
organizational strength into political power within the Farmer‐Labor Party.
However, the Trotskyists’ vision of transforming the Farmer‐Labor Party into an
outright labor party clashed with the Farmer‐Labor leadership’s efforts to build a
strong cross‐class electoral coalition. The militancy of the 1934 strikes also pitted
insurgent labor radicals against the entrenched craft union leaders of the Minnesota
State Federation of Labor. What divided the two factions was a deep‐seated conflict
over the political role of organized labor in modern industrial society. Organized
labor clashed with the Farmer‐Labor Party as well over the representation of the
trade unions in party decision‐making, a conflict made all the more problematical by
the Farmer‐Labor alliance with the Communist Party.
The internal conflict within the labor movement and the Farmer‐Labor Party
over the class character of electoral politics exposed the deeper and more
complicated political loyalties of Minneapolis voters. Despite emerging political
fractures within the Farmer‐Labor Party and the labor movement, a coalition of
workers, farmers, and middle‐class professionals brought Farmer‐Laborites into
office by huge numbers in the 1936 elections. Insurgent, rank‐and‐file militancy
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forged the disparate strands of worker protest into a social movement behind the
policy initiatives of the New Deal. Labor militancy in Minneapolis and across the
industrial North forced parties and the state to take the political demands of
workers seriously. Many of those demands for economic regulation and expanded
social welfare provisions resonated with members of other social classes. However,
this powerful new electoral coalition centered on organized labor was a fragile
creature. Throughout 1937 and 1938, labor factionalism divided workers and
alienated crucial cross‐class allies. These divisions foreclosed the social democratic
possibilities of the New Deal, but not the longterm viability of liberal reform.
In 1938, only two years after the great triumph of liberalism, a landslide
victory of Republican candidates drove Farmer‐Laborites and progressive New Deal
Democrats from office in the industrial North. Divided, dispirited, and reeling from
a renewed bout of economic crisis, neither the Farmer‐Labor Party nor the New
Deal Democrats could reignite the urgency of the 1936 campaigns. These defeats,
though, did not necessarily signal a repudiation of New Deal reform. The victorious
Republicans were not rabid reactionaries committed to eviscerating the liberal,
interventionist state. On the contrary, they refashioned their platforms to
accommodate key elements of New Deal reform, including recognizing the
legitimacy of trade unions and collective bargaining. Minnesota’s Republican
gubernatorial candidate Harold Stassen defined his campaign as a struggle against
the twin forces of reaction and radicalism, thereby redefining his party as a liberal
party. “New Dealized” Republicans like Stassen acknowledged that the political
landscape had changed dramatically since 1933. They aligned themselves with the
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popular support for New Deal social policy, but they remained free to criticize the
“excesses” of the New Deal, namely a militant and politicized labor movement.
For the sake of space and scope, this study omits a number of factors
otherwise central to a history of Minnesota during the height of the Depression. For
one, this is specifically an urban study, and thus the political mobilization and class
interests of farmers are dealt with only tangentially. Closely examining the basic
antagonisms and conflicts of interest between farmers and workers could not be
accommodated as the central arc of this study follows the largely urban issues that
divided the Minneapolis labor movement and Farmer‐Labor Party. Second, the
history of Minneapolis’ twin city St. Paul is also largely ignored for two reasons. For
one, despite being the state capital, St. Paul was not as important economically and
politically as Minneapolis. Second, St. Paul in the 1930s looked dramatically
different from Minneapolis. Paying sufficient attention to those differences would
take additional chapters.
By focusing on Minneapolis, this thesis endeavors to provide a microcosmic
example to understand the factors contributing both to the remarkable expansion
and swift contraction of working‐class politics in the 1930s. The organizational and
political power of labor was critical to an enduring liberal realignment of American
politics. Labor militancy put class antagonisms at the center of a powerful electoral
coalition that was capable of fundamentally redefining New Deal liberalism.
However, factionalism crippled the labor movement’s ability to press the state for
more sweeping and even social democratic change at the national and state level
from 1938 onward. This critical defeat of working‐class politics foreclosed the labor
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movement’s ability to act as an engine of proto‐social democracy, but it also
reaffirmed a commitment to the basic tenets of New Deal liberalism among both
Democrats and key segments of the Republican Party. Yet, as labor’s political
struggles in Minneapolis illustrated, another world was possible.

5

CHAPTER 2
CLASS STRUGGLE IN MINNESOTA

Introduction
The violent outbursts of labor militancy that shook Minneapolis in the
summer of 1934 did not explode spontaneously. Nor were they merely the result of
the economic crisis of the Depression. The unique political economy of Minneapolis,
the metropolitan center of Minnesota and much of the upper Midwest, shaped a
powerful form of social democratic politics that united agrarian protest with urban
trade unionism. Beginning in the 1920s, Minnesota farmer‐laborism railed against
the merchants and bankers who ruled Minneapolis and laid a political foundation
for the labor insurgency of the 1930s. This political context was complicated by the
emergence of a committed corps of Trotskyist militants among the city’s
transportation workers. Thus, the 1934 trucking strikes were a tense moment
when competing ideas about how to challenge the unchecked power of capitalism
collided. Understanding the strikes and their impact on Minneapolis means parsing
out the complicated politics of labor militancy.

The Political Economy of Transportation in Minneapolis
Straddling the Mississippi near its headwaters alongside Saint Paul,
Minneapolis became the upper Midwest’s major commercial and transportation hub
west of Chicago. First by rail and then by highway, Minneapolis became the gateway
for moving people and manufactured goods across the Great Plains. It was also the
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distribution center for the agricultural products, timber, and mineral wealth of the
west. Transportation made Minneapolis an important marketplace and financial
center. This was especially true for agriculture, and the Minneapolis grain exchange
became known (both affectionately and disdainfully) as the “Wall Street of the
Northwest.”
In this developing world of corporate agribusiness, a bustling “craft
economy” of urban commerce emerged clustered around the warehouses and
wholesalers downtown where thousands worked loading and hauling goods
throughout the city and the region.2 Even before the Depression, the truck already
displaced both the horse team and the railroad as the most efficient way to move
products in, around, and out of Minneapolis.3 As journalist Charles Walker wrote:
… Minneapolis is at bottom a city of commerce and transportation, in fact as
well as in spirit. Not only does the citadel of warehouses tell you that, but
you breathe it in the atmosphere of her streets and her market place: those
rows of semitrailers backed up to eight freight depots, the trucks on meat
row and fish row, and the fleets of trucks loading at the city’s 991
wholesalers, or moving out of the city with everything from safety pins to
cultivators to the villages and farms of the Northwest.4
The corporate consolidation of transportation and distribution, coupled with the
mechanization of the teamsters’ craft, reinforced the drivers’ desire to retain a sense
of dignity and independence as independent proprietorship gave way to wage labor.
In Minneapolis as elsewhere, they looked to the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters (IBT) to help them reassert control over the work process and the terms
For an insightful description of craft‐based economies, see Andrew Wender Cohen,
The Racketeer’s Progress: Chicago and the Struggle for the Modern American Economy
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3‐10, 15‐18, passim.
3 Shane Hamilton, Trucking Country: The Road to America’s WalMart Economy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 7.
4 Walker, American City, 2‐3.
2
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of their labor. The IBT considered drivers skilled workers on par with machinists or
carpenters and organized them along strict craft lines depending on what kind of
goods a driver handled. Under the leadership of Daniel Tobin, the IBT was a
conservative, exclusive, and often xenophobic organization.5 The union’s emphasis
on strictly maintaining its distinction as a skilled craft often cut drivers off from
other transportation workers like the “inside men” who loaded and unloaded the
trucks.
While cities like Chicago developed a dense network of powerful craft unions,
organized labor endured a stunted development in Minneapolis. Although drivers
played a crucial role in the city’s economy, the organizational structure and
attitudes of the IBT limited the drivers’ ability to challenge the authority of
increasingly sophisticated employers. Confronting the drivers was the Citizens
Alliance (CA), an association that represented a broad cross‐section of Minneapolis
employers to coordinate capital’s resistance to organized labor. Formed in 1903,
the CA was headed by the city’s business elite and espoused a strident open‐shop
philosophy founded on “a defense of property and a defense of liberty…
synonymous with the defense of the nation.”6 The CA’s economic clout directly
influenced every branch of state government. In 1916 and 1917, the CA
orchestrated the successful repression of a general strike called by the city’s drivers

David Witwer, Corruption and Reform in the Teamsters Union (Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press, 2003), 61.
6 William Millikan, A Union Against Unions: The Minneapolis Citizens Alliance and its
Fight Against Organized Labor, 19031947 (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical
Society Press, 2001), 15.
5

8

and warehouse workers and another called by the streetcar workers’ union.7 Once
the United States entered World War I, employers under the guise of the Minnesota
Commission for Public Safety were able to assume nearly dictatorial power under
the pretense of wartime emergency.8 Through its paramilitary arm the Civilian
Auxiliary and with the aid of the Espionage and Sedition Acts, the commission
effectively drove Minneapolis’ only Socialist mayor from power in 1918.9 Through
the legislature and the courts the power of labor was formally restricted; through
the police, the National Guard, and Pinkerton agents, labor was forcibly beaten back.
The workers of Minneapolis could draw two competing, but not mutually
exclusive lessons, from this formative period of working‐class activism and labor
repression. First, the overt class rule of the Citizens Alliance and the weakness of
the craft unions convinced many workers of the need for independent political
action to advance labor’s cause. The election of a Socialist mayor indicated an
emerging working‐class consciousness among the city’s workers. Yet the weakness
of the Socialists’ electoral coalition to withstand an assault from capital also
highlighted the limits of class politics to win popular support. Moreover, the city
and state’s political institutions proved extremely susceptible to being seized or
outflanked by capital. Second, workers realized they also needed powerful unions
to act as autonomous organizations to defend themselves and their specific interests
“One Thousand Teamsters are Denied Rights,” “City Council Hears Labor’s Side of
Story,” Minneapolis Labor Review, June 16, 1916, 1; “Thugs and Gunmen Invade the
City at Masters’ Call,” Minneapolis Labor Review, June 30, 1916, 1.
8 Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States
(New York: Norton, 1979), 88‐89.
9 Carol Jenson, “Loyalty as a Political Weapon: The 1918 Campaign in Minnesota,”
Minnesota History 43 (2) 1972: 43‐57.
7
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against employers and the state. The intertwined power of capital and the state
proved to workers that winning even moderate concessions from employers would
require a bitter and determined struggle. Yet too militant an action (like a general
strike) could also provoke the full force of state repression. The preceding sketch of
the Minneapolis political economy illustrates how the city’s workers faced a
problem endemic to the American labor movement: how to reconcile class‐based
electoral politics with “pure and simple” unionism. This problem would find a
unique resolution in the revived surge of agrarian protest reshaping Minnesota’s
political culture.

Radical Farmers, Organized Workers
Even though men with names like Pillsbury, Crosby, Washburn, and
Weyerhauser were still “bankers, or railroad directors, or the owners of the flour
mills,” by the mid‐1930s Minnesota politics was dominated by people with names
like Olson, Peterson, and Anderson.10 The movement that successfully challenged
the political hegemony of Minneapolis’ New England capitalists took shape in the
1920s as urban workers joined forces with farmers. David Brody argues that the
rise of farmer‐labor politics was a specific response to a steep decline in crop prices
and the widespread postwar repression of organized labor. Crisis convinced both
groups to renounce voluntarism, reconcile (or at least ignore) their intrinsic class
differences, and seek a redress for their grievances through the state. However,
once the federal government responded with limited farm subsidies and some
10

Walker, American City, 4.
10

protection for the railway brotherhoods in 1923 and 1924, both the AFL and its
agrarian counterpart the Farm Bureau backed away from third party politics and
radicalism in general.11 While this is a convincing account from an elite perspective,
Brody’s analysis fails to address why farmer‐laborism endured in places like
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Washington into the 1930s. Farmer‐laborism was able
to remain relevant beyond the mid‐1920s wherever it could move beyond narrow
economic interests and embrace a more expansive and malleable social democratic
platform. A fluid definition of class politics united otherwise antagonistic social
grouping together as “producers” against a parasitic elite to defend core American
values against an exploitive and tyrannical status quo.12 Farmers, workers, as well
as the professional and intellectual fractions of the middle class rallied behind a
program that allowed them to confront the agents of their exploitation and elect
some of their own to high office.
Farmer‐laborism in Minnesota emerged in the form of a mass social
democratic party and won astounding early victories. In 1918, the state branch of
the North Dakota‐based farmers’ association the Non‐Partisan League (NPL) and the
Working People’s Nonpartisan Political League (WPNPL), the political arm of the
Minnesota State Federation of Labor, cobbled together a third party out of a diffuse
collection of groups that included disaffected progressive Republicans, socialists,
prohibitionists, and isolationists under the “Farmer‐Labor Party” (FLP) banner. The
FLP advocated for state control over banks, mills, and grain elevators to check the
David Brody, “On the Failure of U.S. Radical Politics: A Farmer‐Labor Analysis,”
Industrial Relations 22 (2) 1983, 152‐53.
12 Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1998), 16.
11
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power of commercial and corporate agricultural interests based in Minneapolis and
pledged to protect labor’s right to organize. The FLP relied upon a democratic and
decentralized party structure of membership branches. The basic units of the
Farmer‐Labor Federation (renamed the Farmer‐Labor Association in 1925) were
local Farmer‐Labor clubs and affiliated economic organizations, chiefly labor unions.
The FLP was organized as a bottom‐up institution of farmers and workers that
provided space for the divergent concerns of both groups.13 Following four years of
party‐building and organizing, the FLP went into the 1922 elections as a confident
and insurgent party, winning both of Minnesota’s US Senate seats, a Congressional
race, and only narrowly losing the contest for governor.
From the onset, the Farmer‐Labor Party was committed foremost to
achieving electoral success and the leadership was fully prepared to compromise on
its policies and politics in order to build the kind of broad‐based coalition needed to
win elections.14 According to its Declaration of Principles: “The Farmer‐Labor
movement seeks to unite into a political organization all persons engaged in
agriculture and other useful industry and those in sympathy with their interests, for
the purpose of securing legislation that will protect and promote the economic
welfare of the wealth producers.”15 Nevertheless, the FLP’s principles and the
“How the Farmer‐Labor Association Works,” (St. Paul, MN: Education Bureau of
the Farmer‐Labor Association, 1936), 5, box 1, folder American City Farmer‐Labor
Party (Chapter 5), Conventions, 1934 and 1936, Charles Rumford Walker Papers at
the Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul.
14 Millard Gieske, MinnesotaFarmer Laborism: The ThirdParty Alternative
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 32.
15 “Declaration of Principles,” March 20, 1925, box 3, folder Educational Bureau
Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers, undated, 1925‐1939, Farmer‐Labor
Association of Minnesota Papers at the Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul.
13
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party’s very name differentiated the interests of farmers and workers from those of
commercial and corporate concerns. The FLP directed farmer and labor discontent
against specific capitalist institutions, such as mills, packinghouses, and the
Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, rather than capitalism itself. At its most
effective, the FLP’s “American concept of socialism” struck a difficult balance
between the needs of farmers and workers.16 Both the FLP and the craft union
leaders of the State Federation of Labor fully agreed with Selig Perlman’s
pronouncement that “labor needs the support of public opinion, meaning the middle
class, both rural and urban.”17 Farmer‐Laborites effectively prefigured the central
tenets of Keynesianism and advocated subsidies and price controls to aid farmers
and collective bargaining to increase the purchasing power of workers. In a society
wracked by economic inequality and crisis, a fluid (or ill‐defined) conception of
class conflict allowed the FLP to adapt its radicalism to suit the demands of shifting
political realities to win elections in tough times.
The stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Depression only added to
the hard times of Minnesota’s farmers and workers and expanded the appeal of
farmer‐laborism. The dynamic and charismatic Farmer‐Laborite Floyd B. Olson was
elected governor in 1930. Two years later, Olson was reelected and along with him
were five US Congressional representatives and a working Farmer‐Labor majority in
the state house of representatives. Spurred by the deepening effects of the
Depression and continued public discontent with the Republican Party, Olson
Arthur Naftalin, A History of the FarmerLabor Party of Minnesota (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1948), 73.
17 Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement (New York: Macmillan, 1928),
160‐61.
16
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pushed the FLP further left. A member of the IWW while working odd jobs in the
Pacific Northwest in his youth, he remade himself as a moderate liberal, first as a
Democrat and then as the Farmer‐Labor attorney of Hennepin County. As the
Depression wore on he revived his radical reputation with fiery and vaguely anti‐
capitalist rhetoric. In a campaign speech assailing the Republicans in 1932, Olson
avowed:
We are on the threshold of important changes in the social and economic
structure and the foe is desperate. There is a new deal coming to the farmer,
the worker, the masses generally who have been downtrodden throughout
the ages. There is nothing that can prevent its coming‐ not even the
Republican Party. The gods that this party has worshipped are beginning to
fail them. That party has failed and is bankrupt because it has no vision of a
new and fairer society.18
At the state convention of the Farmer‐Labor Association in March of 1934, Olson
famously declared: “I am not a liberal, I am what I want to be‐ a radical.”19 Under
Olson the Farmer‐Labor Party advanced the idea of a “cooperative commonwealth”
under which the state and federal government would own and operate public
utilities and key industries along with producer and consumer cooperative
management of the remaining large‐scale enterprises.20 Nevertheless, Olson’s
reforms fell rather neatly in line with those of Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal,
namely a state social security program, a partial moratorium on farm mortgages,
and a progressive income tax. Even though the FLP’s politics steered clear of

Third Party Footprints: An Anthology from Writings and Speeches of Midwest
Radicals, James M. Youngdale, ed. (Minneapolis: Ross & Haines, Inc., 1966), 250.
19 Quoted in Gieske, Minnesota FarmerLaborism, 188.
20 Speech by Vincent Day, no date (ca. 1934), box 2, folder Speeches by Vincent A.
Day, undated, Vincent Alpheus Day Papers at the Minnesota Historical Society, St.
Paul.
18
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revolution, the distinctly radical components of farmer‐labor rhetoric stuck out
conspicuously during the first years of the Depression.
In this context, the precise political role of the labor movement was still an
open question in the early years of Olson’s administration. By the early 1930s, The
Farmer‐Labor Party had successfully mobilized both farmers and urban voters, but
it now needed the critical support of organized workers to cement its political
presence in Minnesota. Unions could provide candidates with campaign funding
and volunteers, and especially the crucial electoral mobilization of workers.
Organized labor, too, required the assistance of a sympathetic state to overcome the
immense resources and concerted resistance of organized capital. The revitalization
of organized labor still posed a number of interrelated problems for farmer‐labor
politics. If the FLP fought too aggressively to rebuild the unions, the party could be
perceived as privileging labor’s interests over those of farmers. If the party failed to
assist in the establishment of successful unions, then urban workers would have
little material incentive to continue to align with the FLP. While the Farmer‐Labor
leadership initially looked to the moribund AFL unions to rebuild the labor
movement, a new culture of working‐class activism was beginning to assert itself in
opposition to conservative and exclusive craft union tradition. Under the aegis of
the city’s teamsters union, an insurgent labor movement in Minneapolis tested the
Farmer‐Labor Party’s commitment to radicalism as well as its ability to act as an
impartial arbiter of social conflict.

15

Roots of an Insurgency
While the Farmer‐Labor Party was consolidating its political strength, the
trade unions struggled to rebuild. In the aftermath of the 1916 teamsters’ strike, the
General Drivers and Helpers Local 574 settled into obscurity as a small union of only
100 odd members. Although the union never won a single strike until 1934, union
membership did entitle a driver to slightly better wages working for one of the few
unionized hauling firms in the city.21 However, Minneapolis’ strict open shop
economy made the union’s bargaining position precarious and the leadership of
both the local and international loathe to call strikes even in the face of drastic pay
cuts.22 William Brown, the local’s longtime president, described the dismal early
years of Local 574 in 1937:
I joined the Drivers’ Union in 1919. We had our regular meetings and the
fellers would beef until two in the morning. I once proposed an organization
campaign, but a couple of members got in an argument as to who’d moved
the heaviest piano that day. That ended the discussion…. Finally for some
reason or other, the Teamsters [Joint] Council [32] gave me the job of
International Organizer in 1933. So I decided to work with a few guys who
knew how to organize. We had dwindled down to ninety members. After the
coal owners had refused us recognition, I proposed to the Teamsters Council
that we strike. I said, “If we lose we’re no worse off than we are, this is no
union we’ve got anyway.” The workers want to organize if they can get
confidence in us. If we win the coal strike we can organize the whole
trucking industry.23
Farrell Dobbs, Teamster Rebellion (New York: Monad Press, 1972), 38.
Letter from Daniel J. Tobin to Clifford Hall, April 23, 1930, Mss 848, box 15, folder
3, Farrell Dobbs Papers at the Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison.
23 Walker, “A Militant Trade Union, Minneapolis: Municipal Profile,” Survey Graphic,
January 1937, 29, box 1, folder, Newspaper clippings and magazine articles, Local
574 strike 1934, Walker Papers. Brown’s claim that there were 90 members falls
between the estimates given by Teamster militants Jack Maloney and Farrell Dobbs,
who put the total membership at around 175 and 75, respectively, before 1933.
Maloney, it should be noted, acted as Dobbs’ fact checker for his books on the
Minneapolis teamsters. Jack Maloney interview, April 21‐25, 1988, Twentieth‐
21
22
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Among those “few guys who knew how to organize” were Carl Skoglund and
Vincent Raymond Dunne. Skoglund emigrated from Sweden to Minnesota in 1911
and shortly thereafter joined the Socialist Party and the IWW while working as an
itinerant laborer. In Minneapolis, Skoglund, who considered himself first and
foremost a revolutionary internationalist, was inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution
and helped found the state branch of the Communist Party (CP) in 1919. Vincent
Dunne was also a Wobblie and a Socialist from the north woods of Minnesota and
joined Skoglund in the CP. Both Skoglund and Dunne were active in the labor
movement and the Farmer‐Labor Association before being expelled in 1926 from
the two organizations for being Communists.24 The CP provided a platform for their
radical activism and Dunne ran as the party’s candidate for the US Senate in 1928.
Later that same year, however, Skoglund, Dunne, his two younger brothers Grant
and Miles, and fifteen other comrades were driven from the party for supporting the
“Left Opposition” of Leon Trotsky against Joseph Stalin.
The Dunne brothers and Skoglund joined the Left Opposition’s US wing, the
Communist League of America (CLA), led by James P. Cannon, Max Shachtman, and
Martin Abern. The Dunnes and Skoglund were particularly close with Cannon, a
Midwesterner and former IWW organizer on the Iron Range, whom they met in 1924
when he was still a ranking member of the CP.25 Trotskyism, Cannon explained, was the
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“restoration, the revival, of genuine Marxism as it was expounded and practiced in the
Russian revolution.”26 Trotsky argued that revolution was a struggle of working-class
self-emancipation, both inside and outside Russia, whereas Stalin’s parochial and
regressive idea of “socialism in one state” relied on authoritarian party bureaucracy to
suffocate proletarian activism.27 The Stalinists fought ferocious battles with their rivals
on the left, as the Communists and Social Democrats did in Germany, rather than unite to
defeat their enemies on the right. Horrified by these developments, Trotsky argued that
the workers must lead the party, not visa versa. Under Stalin, he argued, the party was
disconnected from the real struggles of the proletariat and concerned only with the
consolidation of its own power. The American Trotskyists organized the Communist
League as a vanguard party, composed of the most class-conscious elements of the
proletariat, to guide the masses though the process of raising class consciousness,
recasting defeats and ideological missteps as the formative experiences leading
eventually to genuine proletarian revolution.
Trotsky’s interpretation of revolutionary socialism was fundamental to the
organizing strategy of the Minneapolis militants. Trotsky advanced the concept of
permanent revolution: “A revolution which makes no compromise with any single
form of class rule, which does not stop at the democratic stage, which goes over to
socialist measures and to war against reaction from without .”28 Trotsky’s emphasis
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on militancy as the key to raising working‐class consciousness resonated most
deeply with the Teamster militants. “The essential task of the American Communist
Left,” Trotsky counseled his US followers in 1929, “consists of direct action upon the
revolutionary elements of the [working] class.”29 While the Communists denounced
organizing within the AFL as “trade union fetishism,” the Trotskyists opted to work
within the mainstream labor movement. Cannon considered the CP’s brand of dual
unionism to be wholly counterproductive because it isolated the revolutionary
militant in “artificial and ideal unions of their own.” Instead the revolutionary
needed “to plunge into the labor movement as it existed and try to influence it from
within.” 30 This relationship to the labor movement underpinned the idea of
“entryism,” burrowing within an institution to transform it into an organ of
revolutionary activity, as a core principle of the Trotskyist movement. The trade
union organizing united workers and revolutionaries together in a genuine mass
working‐class organization. For the revolutionary in the trade union the next step
was preparing the workers for a militant confrontation with capital.
The Trotskyists made Minneapolis a base for the small breakaway
communist sect and set to work building a following among the city’s drivers.31
Skoglund and the Dunnes chose to organize the trucking industry because of its
extensive reach into nearly all aspects of the city’s economy and because
Minneapolis was the central transit hub for goods being moved across the upper
Midwest. Declining wages and longer hours also afflicted trucking and hauling; for
Trotsky, “Greetings Sent to the Weekly,” The Militant, December 14, 1929.
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example, drivers and warehouse workers put in fifty‐four to ninety hour weeks just
to earn twelve to eighteen dollars.32 The fact that leading members of the
Communist League already worked as drivers made trucking an obvious entry
point. Skoglund, blacklisted from most jobs, found work in the coal yards hauling
heating fuel throughout Minneapolis during the city’s brutal winters as an
independent trucker. Dunne worked in the yards as a weigh master at a small coal
firm owned by a family of sympathetic socialists. Organizing the coal yard drivers,
the Trotskyists surmised, would require militant direct action to break through
employers’ rigid defense of the open shop.
The Trotskyists’ organizing was both aided and compromised by the labor
reforms enacted by the New Deal. Negotiating the role of state intervention posed
theoretical and practical problems for the Trotskyist militants. Early New Deal
labor reform acknowledged the rights of organized labor, but did little to ensure its
enforcement. The National Recovery Administration (NRA) established by NIRA
was designed to reduce “destructive competition” by having industries create
“codes of fair competition” that would regulate prices and wages in order to
stimulate economic growth. Federal legislation, especially Section 7(a) of 1933’s
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), provided an important catalyst for the
shop floor insurgency experienced throughout the US in the early 1930s.33 Labor
unions were considered a critical mechanism to keep firms in line with the codes
and to increase the purchasing power of workers. Section 7(a) relied upon the
Walker, American City, 85.
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voluntary compliance of employers to recognize unions, forcing unionists across the
country to wage prolonged and often violent recognition strikes against the
determined resistance of business. These strikes were directed almost equally
against the government for its failure to uphold the labor provisions of the NRA.34
The Trotskyists were initially willing to utilize the machinery of federal labor
law because it offered a sense of legitimacy to union activities. Local 574 announced
in July of 1933 that it would waive initiation fees for new members to take
advantage of Section 7(a)’s provisions providing the right of workers to form and
join labor organizations of their own choosing. The local also prepared to submit a
code of wage rates for drivers to the district NRA commissioner.35 As much as they
deeply distrusted bourgeois reformism, the promised reforms of the New Deal
provided a convenient avenue to begin channeling rank‐and‐file anger and
frustration into the union. The obvious problem for revolutionary militants was
how to utilize reformist measures like the NRA to advance the working‐class
struggle without becoming subsumed by reformism. They rationalized that in a city
as viciously anti‐union as Minneapolis federal reform alone could not win
organizing drives. The Trotskyists girded the union for a prolonged and bitter
struggle to win recognition.
Influenced by Marxist dialectical materialism, a sense of history guided the
Trotskyist militants of 574. As staunch Marxist‐Leninists, the Trotskyists perceived
the Depression as moment of capitalist crisis that could only produce mass
Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America, 19201935 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 213.
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revolutionary consciousness through the leadership of a disciplined vanguard. The
Communist League cadres “could fulfill this role in the trucking industry if they
could link themselves with the militant workers through the trade union
movement.”36 How to make the connection between trade union work and
revolutionary class struggle tangible for workers was a matter of making Marxist
theory relatable to their daily experiences. However, simply appealing to the
drivers and convincing them of the need not only for a union, but to fight for one,
was the militants’ primary mission. Journalist Charles Rumford Walker sketched
the political attitudes representative of the truck drivers he interviewed in 1933 and
1934 in preparation for his “rank‐and‐file history” of Minneapolis, American City.
Walker found the typical Minneapolis trucker before the strikes to be nonunion and
generally ignorant of or uninterested in politics or social concerns. Yet, he also
found the working‐class of Minnesota to be “more politically sensitive” given the
presence of the “old Socialist movement, the long history of Populism, and revolt
from the Non‐Partisan League to the… Farmer‐Labor Party.” 37 Walker sensed a
nascent radicalism within the consciousness of the city’s workers underpinned by
the political struggles that contributed to the rise of the Farmer‐Labor Party. The
abysmal conditions in the coal yards, as well as across Minneapolis and the entire
country, provided the space for a reawakening of radical protest.
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Confrontation
1934 bore witness to 1,856 strikes that involved almost 1.5 million workers,
the greatest demonstration of labor militancy since the end of the First World War.
The series of trucking strikes in Minneapolis helmed by Local 574 bore close
resemblance to similar labor uprisings in the auto parts plants of Toledo and the on
docks of San Francisco that same year. These three conflicts involved elements of
leftist leadership, mass rank‐and‐file participation, and violent, confrontational
tactics to win strike demands.38 Moreover, all three strikes involved a significant
measure of local resistance to the conservatism of the parent AFL union and
altercations with state and local governments. The 1934 strike wave was an
illustration of how ideas about class struggle took concrete form. While the
outbreak of labor insurgency in Minneapolis was influenced by the same national
trends that spurred strikes in Toledo and San Francisco, the political character of
the trucking strikes was defined by unique local circumstances. The Trotskyists’
application of Marxist theory to the complex daily struggles of workers directly
confronted the political context shaped by the governing Farmer‐Labor Party and
employers organized in the Citizens Alliance. Since the trucking strikes themselves
have been extensively scrutinized in other works, the point of this brief summary is
to examine their political ramifications.39 Specifically, this analysis will examine
Howard Kimeldorf, Reds or Rackets? The Making of Radical and Conservative
Unions on the Waterfront (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 100.
39 Cf. Dobbs, Teamster Rebellion, and Walker, American City, for the authoritative
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account of the surge in labor militancy throughout the 1930s. A more recent work,
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how the strikes shaped and reshaped the politics of working‐class culture in
Minneapolis.
At the beginning of 1934, 574’s leadership prepared for action against the
coal yard operators in the midst of a characteristically brutal Minnesota winter.
Daniel Tobin and the IBT were adamantly opposed to any strike activity that would
jeopardize the peaceful relations the local had carved out for the handful of drivers
covered by contracts in the city’s craft economy. In a letter to local president
William Brown, Tobin bluntly wrote that without official sanction from the
International the local would not receive any strike funds and would risk losing its
union charter.40 That same day, Tobin wrote an open letter to the membership
warning of the difficulties of waging a strike and ominously reminded them “of the
bitter experiences which organized labor has to encounter from the employers as
well as from the prejudiced courts and the police force.”41 He was also becoming
increasingly frustrated by the local’s radicals and reached out to the Minneapolis
AFL establishment for assistance. A lifelong Democrat and strident anticommunist
Tobin was, to use Bruce Laurie’s term, a classic Samuel Gompers‐style “prudential
unionist” who explicitly rejected militancy and radicalism to avert state
repression.42 He urged the city’s Central Labor Union (CLU) to put greater pressure
State University Press, 1995), contains a host of interviews with participants on
both sides of the picket line.
40 Letter from Daniel J. Tobin to William S. Brown, January 6, 1934, Minneapolis
Teamsters Strike, 1934: Selected Documents, 1928‐1941 at the Minnesota Historical
Society, Manuscript Collection Microfilm Call # M494, St. Paul, referred to hereafter
as 574 Papers.
41 Letter from Daniel J. Tobin to Local 574, January 6, 1934, 574 Papers.
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the local leaders “and make the request that all individuals who sympathize with the
Communist movement be eliminated from Local No. 574.” “There is a distinct
difference,” Tobin continued, “between a Socialist of the old trade union type and
the new type of Communists, whose theories and doctrines are founded on the
revolution of the workers.”43 For a prudential unionist like Tobin, talk of revolution
only invited labor repression.
Tobin’s admonishments and pleas for help in the CLU did little to quell the
drivers’ militancy. The teamster president, though, seriously misunderstood the
mood of the workers. They reasoned that preserving Local 574 as an exclusive craft
organization could no longer protect drivers as the economy bottomed out. In a last
ditch effort to preserve peace, Tobin denied the local strike assistance on the
technicality that not all members had been with the organization for the requisite
six months.44 But on February 7, 600 members of Local 574 voted to strike and the
next day drivers picketed every coal yard in the city.45 In an impressive display of
disciplined militancy, the drivers effectively shut down the city’s coal industry. After
two days the St. Paul‐Minneapolis Regional Labor Board of the NRA issued a
proposal guaranteeing a certification election to end the strike.46 The aggressive
and well‐organized conduct of the strike pressured the board to move the
certification election ahead of schedule in the hopes of stemming any further work
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stoppages.47 The employers, though, refused to recognize the union and cited
General Hugh S. Johnson and Donald Richberg’s official interpretation of Section
7(a) that “neither employers or employees are required by law, to agree to any
particular contract, whether proposed as an individual or collective agreement.”48
The final agreement reached by the board secured a small wage increase for the
drivers, but the employers refused to recognize the union.49
Although the February coal strike won relatively little for Minneapolis
drivers, Local 574 developed a newfound organizational cohesion that would prove
essential in taking on the city’s transportation industry. By March the voluntary
organizing committee grew to include a host of new Communist League members
including a young trucker from north Minneapolis named Farrell Dobbs, in addition
to the Dunnes, and Skoglund. The militants considered the structure and ideology
of the party to be crucial to building the union as well as working‐class radicalism.
James Cannon concluded that the coal yard strike succeeded because the strike
leaders worked so closely with the Communist League.50 The Trotskyists did not
hide their political affiliations. When asked about their politics at membership
meetings Dunne and Skoglund responded openly. “They were very frank,” one
union member recalled. “They made no bones about it that they were members [of
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the Communist League].”51 Dunne and Skoglund “used the Russian Revolution quite
a bit to get workers to understand how to win fights and what they need, that they
need to overthrow the capitalist system.”52 The Trotskyists’ trade union work
embraced bread‐and‐butter bargaining as an initial step in forging revolutionary
class‐consciousness. Central to this work was the reinvention of Local 574 as a
mass union representing workers across the transportation industry. The local’s
organizing committee made liberal use of the local charter’s “general” designation to
organize all workers associated with trucking (e.g. platform, shipping‐room, drivers’
helpers, packers, and yard workers) into a single union. “Into this modernized
machinery of class warfare,” Charles Walker commented, organized truck drivers
could dramatically reshape the power dynamics of the city’s political economy. The
individual driver, he remarked, was like a “sergeant in the strike army” capable of
not only shutting down commerce and industry, but also coordinating the industrial
actions of other workers on the streets.53 Fighting for increased wages and
improved working conditions was not reformist or trade union fetishism, but an
object lesson in the power of workers united as a class to resist oppression and
exploitation.
At first glance the FLP seemed to be a logical ally for 574. As the local
prepared to confront the trucking companies, the Trotskyists reached out to the FLP
for support. Olson was an early and vocal advocate of the teamsters’ organizing
campaigns, but he also was wary of being too closely linked to the Trotskyists who
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were steadily becoming the most prominent figures in the union. Local 574 staged a
mass meeting in April entitled the “The Right to Organize” that was to feature Olson
as the keynote speaker. The governor balked at such an outright association with
the local and sent his personal secretary Vincent Day to read a message on his
behalf. In the message, the governor urged workers “to follow the sensible course
and band together for your own protection and welfare.”54 Olson’s pledge of
solidarity with organized labor and Local 574 gave the campaign a great deal of
prestige and helped attract thousands of drivers and warehouse workers to the
union.55 The governor, though, remained hamstrung by Section 7(a), leaving the
state government and the Regional Labor Board without the leverage to compel
employers united by the Citizens Alliance to recognize the union. In addition, the
Trotskyists’ relation to the Farmer‐Labor government was weighted by pros and
cons. On the one hand, they reasoned that since Olson relied on union support, he
would have to support the organizing drive and not bend to employer demands to
break the strike. On the other, they feared that Olson and the FLP’s ties to the State
Federation of Labor would mean that in the event of a larger strike, the governor
would intervene to try and wrest control of the union from radicals and hand the
organization over to AFL bureaucrats.56
The Trotskyists of 574 appreciated the role of labor reform in provoking
worker militancy and invoked reform provisions when advantageous, but they
dismissed on principle the liberal reforms of the New Deal. Section 7(a) was a sop
Letter from Floyd B. Olson to William S. Brown, April 13, 1934, 574 Papers.
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to the “labor statesmen” of the AFL and did nothing more than cement an elite,
bureaucratic partnership between the state and labor leaders like Tobin at the
expense of workers. The resolution of the coal yard strike demonstrated the labor
mediation board’s inherent weakness. Citing code violations, employer
discrimination against unionists, and the overall inability of the NRA to assist
organizing drives, the Trotskyists concluded: “Only where labor has been
powerfully organized and has struck with determination have labor’s rights been
respected.”57 A militant mass movement was necessary to challenge organized
labor’s official complacency to demand the enforcement of the language of Section
7(a).
That spring Local 574 entered into negotiations with the Minneapolis
trucking firms through the Regional Labor Board. Meetings between the union and
the employers group, the General Advisory Committee (GAC), produced little
worthwhile discussion since the GAC continued to refuse to acknowledge the
legitimacy of the Local 574. On May 7, the GAC claimed that 574 did not truly
represent the drivers and broke off dialogue altogether.58 Although the union was
able to prove itself as the drivers’ rightful bargaining agent, subsequent talks
collapsed since the Labor Board was powerless to get the GAC to seriously consider
the union’s demands. To complicate matters, Tobin again denied strike
authorization and asserted that local did not have jurisdiction over inside workers.59
The combination of the militant February strike, the open affiliation of the strike
“Labor and the New Deal,” The Militant, May 5, 1934, 3.
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leaders with the Communist League, and the Trotskyists’ sharp criticism of the NRA,
caused Tobin and the state AFL, as well as Olson, to be wary of the growing power of
the teamsters. The tension in Minneapolis was palpable as Local 574 prepared for
an even larger strike action that spring.
On May 16, 5,000 teamsters went on strike, focusing their attention on the
central commercial market district in downtown Minneapolis. The local organized a
strike headquarters, replete with a garage, infirmary, and mess hall, to coordinate
the dispersal of its motorized “flying squads” of pickets to intercept non‐union
trucks. As in previous strikes, deputized members of the CA’s armed formations
assaulted picket lines and protected convoys of non‐union trucks and bolstered the
city police force. In response to the violence unleashed against strikers, the local
informed Olson that unless the police and deputies were reined in the union would
withdraw from negotiations and “throw out a general call for every worker in
Minneapolis and vicinity to assist us in protecting our rights and our lives.”60 Over
two days, May 21 and 22, strikers in military formation routed the police and CA
forces in the market district and took control over the city’s streets, winning the so‐
called “Battle of Deputies Run.” For the first time in Minneapolis, open class warfare
turned in the workers’ favor. Picket lines held firm and striking drivers famously
directed traffic. The drivers were joined by some 35,000 workers from the building,
iron, electrical, garment, and a slew of other trades on picket lines across the city in
a massive wave of sympathy strikes.61 Olson, who had already mobilized the
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National Guard, moved troops into the market district to restore state control and
on May 23 the local agreed to a truce outlined by Olson.62
Further negotiations helmed by Olson with the aid of federal labor mediators
brought the strike to an end on May 25. Olson’s labor treaty provided for union
recognition and a reaffirmation to the principles of Section 7(a) on the part of the
employers. Since the agreement did not provide for a closed shop or even any
signed agreement, the local would have to negotiate with each firm (a total of 166)
individually. Without industry‐wide bargaining there was no hope of recognition.
Olson’s original agreement stipulated that Local 574 was entitled to represent the
contentious inside workers, but he ultimately relented to pressure from the CA and
the IBT and decided the matter should be left to arbitration‐ a crucial point that
Olson neglected to announce prior to the agreement. In the end the board agreed
with Tobin that inside workers were not under Local 574’s jurisdiction,
undermining the union’s position.
The end of the strike produced a flurry of responses as various factions
attempted to turn the outcome of the city’s most violent labor dispute to their own
advantage. The leaders of the strike admitted to the workers that the agreement
was a “compromise with the bosses,” but one that at least laid the groundwork for
eventual union recognition.63 The Communist Party castigated the teamster
leadership for again winning only meager concessions from the trucking firms.
None other than William Dunne, the eldest of the Dunnes and a staunch Stalinist,
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blasted his brothers and their comrades for squandering a moment of real
revolutionary potential.64 The Communists declared that the unalloyed working‐
class militancy of the May strike had crystallized by the Battle of Deputies Run into
revolutionary consciousness. The very act of taking control of the streets should
have been the moment when the workers turned a mere labor struggle into a
political struggle against capital. In sharp contrast, the jubilant State Federation of
Labor heralded the defeat of the Citizens Alliance and diverted attention from the
Trotskyists by celebrating Olson as the real hero of the strike. The craft unions
emphasized the peaceable resolution hammered out by Olson as the real object
lesson of the strike, not its militancy and violence. The Minneapolis Labor Review
proclaimed the strike a victory for the governor as much as for the teamsters.
Tellingly, the same issue that announced the strike’s resolution also prominently
advertised the opening stages of the FLP’s campaign for the November election.65
The Farmer‐Labor Party wanted nothing more than to disassociate itself
from the violence of the strike. Labor peace was essential to the Farmer‐Labor
campaign in order to downplay the radical image presented by Olson and to deflect
characterizations of the FLP as a party stoking the flames of “class hatred.” Olson’s
settlement was presented as evidence of the Farmer‐Labor government’s cool,
deliberate, and even‐handed ability to resolve tense social conflict. One campaign
leaflet, for example, boasted of the congratulatory telegrams sent by Sen. Robert
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Wagner to Farmer‐Labor Sen. Henrik Shipstead, the federal mediators, and Olson for
finding an amicable resolution to the strike.66 No such telegram was sent to Tobin,
who Wagner contacted at the height of the street fighting demanding to know what
the teamster president was doing to end the strike. An undoubtedly mortified Tobin
could only respond that the situation was beyond his control: “… the truckers had
organized themselves and were making their own battle.”67 The apparent
powerlessness of the labor movement over its own unions increased the political
pressure on the FLP to step into the breach and bridle insurgent workers. The FLP
needed a revived labor movement to serve its ideological and electoral ends, but an
aggressive movement was a liability to the FLP’s political campaign.
However, the weak settlement proffered by Olson served only to exacerbate
the militancy of the teamsters and undermine the legitimacy of the NRA. As
historian Thomas Dorrance points out, labor organizing under the NRA provides an
excellent avenue to “examine those points of contact where individuals directly
experienced the growth of a federal administrative state.”68 First and foremost, the
workers recognized the superior power of direct action and agitation over that of
government agencies with limited capacity to resolve immediate grievances. The
members of Local 574 complained bitterly about the governor’s arbitrated
agreement. At a July 6 membership meeting local leaders registered their disgust
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with the inadequacy of labor reform. Emery Nelson, a union representative to the
Regional Labor Board from the Milk Drivers union, stated in unequivocal terms:
From my experience with the Board you are going to have to be more
militant than you were. You are going to have bigger organizations; all the
strength you can gather together; just so much better will you go on. I want
to say the employers are fighting more bitterly than ever before. They have
stronger organizations. They are trying to calm that article 7‐a of the
National Recovery Act. The labor movement must likewise fight harder.
Roy Weir of the CLU agreed that Section 7(a) was worthless to labor as
implemented by the government, but reminded 574’s members of the governors in
California and Kentucky who at the moment were “breaking the Longshoremen’s…
[and] coal miners strike[s].” “I just wanted to say that we have a Governor in the
State of Minnesota who did not call out his militia to kill people and put fear in
them.”69
The local’s problems with the IBT mounted along with rank‐and‐file
discontent towards the state and federal governments. Business agent Clifford Hall
relayed to the IBT the local’s dissatisfaction with the results of the May strike and
appealed for assistance as the local prepared to resume the strike.70 Thomas
Hughes, the IBT’s Secretary‐Treasurer, denied the request because of outstanding
initiation fees owed to the International.71 The citing of such technicalities could not
mask the IBT’s exasperation with the local’s continued militancy. Tobin’s
embarrassment over his inability to restrain the Trotskyists, coupled with his own
virulent anticommunism, fueled his tirades against the local. According to Tobin,
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communists were “doing more to help place on the statute books adverse legislation
against labor than all the enemies of labor combined.”72 In an editorial in the official
IBT journal, widely reprinted by the CA, Tobin described the Trotskyist strike
leadership as wolves in sheep’s clothing and urged loyal union officers to “stifle such
radicals, because they do not belong in our union”73
The second major trucking strike in three months began on July 16 with the
employers still staunchly opposed to bargaining with the union and the Labor Board
unable to enforce its own rulings. The Battle of Deputies Run and the outpouring of
solidaristic action by fellow workers were a heady manifestation of independent
working‐class power. Such rank‐and‐file militancy helped the leadership of 574
secure the support of the CLU and the business agents of the building trades unions
for the strike. The result was the repudiation of Tobin’s conservative unionism as
well as Olson’s attempts at conciliation. The strike began peaceably and once again
no trucks moved through the market district. After two days the trucking firms
began moving goods under police escort. Neither the employers nor the police
wanted a reprise of May street fighting. Minneapolis Chief of Police Michael
Johannes reportedly informed his officers: “We’re going to start moving goods.
Don’t take a beating. You have shotguns and know how to use them.”74 On the
afternoon of Friday, July 20, a heavily armed police contingent guarded the first
truck moved into the market district as line of pickets looked on helplessly. As the
Quoted in Bert Cochran, Labor and Communism: The Conflict that Shaped American
Unions (Princeton University Press, 1977), 163.
73 Daniel J. Tobin, Official Magazine of the I.B.T., C., S., and H. of A., July 1934, 13, 14,
574 Papers.
74 Dobbs, Teamster Rebellion, 124.
72

35

truck pulled away, a second truck from the union’s flying squadron attempted to
block the police convoy. The police officers responded by laying down a withering
line of fire on the cruising pickets in the bed of the union truck as well as those
massed on the street. In a matter of minutes, the police killed two and wounded
sixty‐seven unarmed pickets, turning the day into “Bloody Friday.” The violence
unleashed by the city police reinforced the local militants’ skepticism of labor
reform legislation and Olson’s claim to be a friend of the worker, while reaffirming
the need to maintain a militant line. In a speech honoring Henry Ness, one of the
workers killed by the police, William Brown lamented: “He believed in the NRA and
the New Deal and in the right of peaceful picketing, but to the dismay and disgust of
all the people of Minneapolis he was shot down.”75 The forty thousand workers who
marched in Ness’ funeral procession were a vivid illustration of the rank‐and‐file
solidarity.
After days of tumultuous and ultimately fruitless negotiations following the
shooting, federal labor mediators E.H. Dunnigan and Father Francis Hass convinced
Olson to threaten both sides with a martial law decree if the two could not agree to a
final compromise. The Hass‐Dunnigan plan met several key union demands and
called for certification elections at all 166 trucking firms, the reinstatement of
striking workers, and defined the establishment of uniform wage scale as a
legitimate bargaining issue.76 The union membership voted almost unanimously to
accept the plan, while the CA’s Employers’ Advisory Committee rebelled once again
Speech by William S. Brown, no date (ca. July 24, 1934), box 1, folder American
City notes: Local 574 and strike, Walker Papers.
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on the grounds that 574 was not the rightful bargaining agent of the workers and
that its leadership was “Communistic,” leaving Olson to take the initiative and
declared martial law on July 26.77 The Strike Committee of 100, the local’s rank‐
and‐file steering committee, demanded that Olson withdraw the National Guard and
allow for peaceful picketing.78 The strike leaders called a mass meeting of pickets at
strike headquarters scheduled for 4 a.m. on Wednesday, August 1, to organize a
protest in defiance of the martial law order.79 But just moments before 4 a.m., 800
troops descended upon strike headquarters and arrested 53 unionists, including
William Brown and Miles and Vincent Dunne.80 “For the first time in decades,” 574’s
strike newspaper the Organizer seethed,
a trade union headquarters has been occupied by military forces and trade
union leaders imprisoned in a military stockade. Not even in Toledo, where
troops were called out by a Democratic Governor, nor in San Francisco,
where they were called out by a Republican Governor, has such a monstrous
violation of the rights of workingmen been perpetrated.81
Many in Local 574 felt Olson betrayed the FLP’s claim to be a working‐class party by
sending in troops to protect the employer’s property instead of the drivers’ picket
lines. A letter to the editor of the Organizer noted: “I wish the Truck Drivers would
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have received such cooperation of this famous Farmer‐Labor Governor as the
bosses do.”82
In defending the arrests and seizure of strike headquarters, Olson claimed
“the guard had no alternative” and that clamping down on unlawful pickets was the
only response.83 Fearing public backlash and the alienation of his base in the labor
movement, he issued a statement defending the crackdown on the strikers as a way
to protect the strike and the general public.84 To compensate for the seizure of
strike headquarters, Olson ordered the National Guard to raid the Citizens Alliance
headquarters and confiscate intelligence about employers’ anti‐strike tactics, but it
produced little information thanks to CA informants within the National Guard. The
symbolic use of troops against employers was largely an attempt to restore Olson’s
credibility as an impartial arbiter in the eyes of the general public.
Olson closely watched the public’s reaction to the strike developments as he
prepared for reelection in November. In a memo to Olson, his personal secretary
Vincent Day explained that most people were very much in support of the strikers
and agreed with their demands. However, “The public is against the strike weapon.
It annoys, irritates, and frightens the consumers, but that is the extent of their
opposition. The strike as a remedy for labor difficulties is senseless, stupid.”
Prefiguring the impetus for the Wagner Act, Day continued that the FLP needed to
push for the institution of “a strong labor code containing a real guarantee of the
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right of collective bargaining” in order to ensure labor peace.85 Labor peace was
central to farmer‐laborism’s electoral strategy as well as its ideological makeup.
Like the first British Labour government, the Farmer‐Labor Party “had no hostility
to strikers, only strikes.”86 To win the continued support of cross‐class allies,
political scientist Adam Przeworski argues, a social democratic party must remain
committed to the legal democratic process and not be tempted to substitute mass
action for a legislative mandate. The social democrats’ choice to wield the “political
weapon” meant that they must forgo extra‐parliamentary tactics like strikes to
achieve political results.87 The FLP was eager to dispel any public perception that
the party was aiding and abetting the teamsters’ industrial action against the
capitalist class of Minneapolis. However, Olson could not abandon his core urban
constituency, particularly since their demands had nonetheless generated popular
support.
Over the next three weeks a “war of attrition” was waged as Olson, the strike
leaders of 574, and the CA hashed out a series of proposals and counter‐proposals.88
Once again establishing labor peace was crucial for the FLP as election season drew
nearer, but this time Olson was committed to negotiating a settlement that would
placate the militant drivers. The violence of Bloody Friday, the political fallout of
the martial law decree and the arrest of the strike leadership, and the unbridled
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militancy of the membership, compelled Olson to finally take a hard‐line against the
employers. In a sharp rebuke, Olson wrote to the CA: “The agencies of government
do not belong to you…. They belong to all the people and I propose to use the
governmental agencies under my jurisdiction, including the national guard, for the
protection of all the people of the city of Minneapolis.”89 Finally on August 21, after
Olson requested the personal intercession of Roosevelt, the trucking firms agreed to
the provisions of the original Hass‐Dunnigan plan, securing for 574 official
recognition, a uniform minimum wage, and the right to represent all of its members.

Aftermath
For the members of Local 574, the strikes provided an object lesson in the
power of militant and radical unionism to effect real change. As Howard Kimeldrof
argues in his study of San Francisco dockworkers during the Depression,
revolutionary language in tandem with social action could forge a militant rank‐and‐
file class‐consciousness.90 Yet the process of radicalization produced its own unique
set of tensions that animated the struggle for union recognition. The bloody strikes
waged by Local 574 throughout 1934 to introduce organized labor to Minneapolis
succeeded because of working‐class militancy. The strikes represented a moment
where labor repression was overcome by united labor action. Crucial to this victory
were the Trotskyist teamsters, labor militants who were neither outside agitators
nor actors willed into being by the unique historical phenomenon of the Depression
alone. The victory of the teamsters in Minneapolis sent shockwaves through the IBT
89
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and the city’s business community. The Citizens’ Alliance continued to hammer
away at the local, but its agitation yielded few results as employers lined up to sign
union contracts with their workers. By May of 1935 the entire trucking industry in
Minneapolis operated under a closed shop agreement. The militancy of the strikes
and the radicalism of Local 574’s leadership deeply unnerved Tobin and
conservative business unionists in the AFL. Thus, in the ensuing years many of
Local 574’s most bitter battles would not be waged employers, but conservative
opponents in the labor movement.
Olson managed to navigate his way through the strikes with most of his
political credibility intact but the FLP would pay a price for its involvement in the
drivers’ labor dispute. Vincent Day reminded Olson the day before the election that
the “real issue in Minneapolis is the truck strike” and that the governor needed to
carefully explain his handling of the situation to the voters.91 Campaign literature
pointed out that the governor maintained law and order while also supporting the
strikers.
Governor Olson is the first governor in America to call out the militia during a
strike for the purpose of protecting all the people and not the as an agency to
break up a strike by shooting unarmed workers fighting for an American
standard of living. He handled a major strike by placing a city under martial
law without the shedding of blood.92
The FLP slate won the 1934 elections, but the fault lines in the party’s coalition were
starting to appear. Olson won reelection, but he beat his Republican challenger by
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only 70,000 votes compared to the almost 200,000 vote difference he enjoyed two
years earlier.93 The strikes crippled the FLP’s support in rural communities. For
instance, in 1932 Olson handily won 46 of the state’s 84 rural counties, but in 1934
he lost 95 percent of those same counties.94 Given this reversal of fortune, the fact
that he was still able to win is quite astounding. Olson and the FLP consolidated its
strength in urban areas and counted a rejuvenated labor movement as an important
voting bloc. Nonetheless, the 1934 trucking strikes convinced Olson that party
could not afford to become entangled in another labor dispute of such magnitude.
The future of Farmer‐Labor politics would depend on its ability to harness the
political resources of the trade unions while maintaining a safe distance from its
disputes.
The radicalism of the strike and the repression meted out against the strikers
marked a decisive moment in shaping working‐class consciousness in Minneapolis.
Charles Walker noted in his composite description of a Minneapolis trucker that
certain communist ideas about class exploitation resonated with Minneapolis
workers after the strikes. For instance, the idea of the state as an instrument of
class domination “gibed quite perfectly with his own experience when the State of
Minnesota called in [the] militia to break the drivers’ strike, so that he believes that
principle passionately, and talks on that point like a Communist.” Yet, the typical
driver “still votes for Olson, denies being a Communist, and has even beaten up a
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few in his day.”95 The Trotskyists proved their worth as organizers throughout
1934 and tapped into a strong undercurrent of working‐class radicalism amongst
Minneapolis workers. The strikes helped to awaken this tradition and radicalize
workers through solidaristic action, even if the demands made by the strikers were
themselves not inherently radical. The next major challenge for the Trotskyist
teamsters was to find a way to translate their newfound organizational power into
political power. This process would divide the city’s labor movement, strain its ties
to the Farmer‐Labor Party, and dramatically reshape the political landscape of
Minneapolis.

95

Walker, “Notes for Life Story of a Trucker,” 2‐3, Walker Papers.
43

CHAPTER 3
THE POLITICS OF MAKING MINNEAPOLIS A UNION TOWN, 19351936

Introduction
The near‐insurrectionary trucking strikes of 1934 gave organized labor its
first real foothold in the political economy of Minneapolis. By the time another
wave of violent strikes rolled through the city in the summer of 1935 General
Drivers and Helpers Local 574 was the largest and most influential union in the
state, winning concessions from employers in the workplace and pressuring
political parties and the state to take the demands of workers seriously. Labor
militancy also exposed serious divisions between conservative union leaders and
radical rank‐and‐file activists. Local 574’s clashes with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters and the AFL threatened to split the urban labor vote
crucial to the electoral success of Minnesota’s governing Farmer‐Labor Party. The
newfound power of Local 574 made the Trotskyists influential figures in Farmer‐
Labor politics. Like their Communist Party adversaries, they too opted to embrace
electoral politics and downplay the rhetoric of revolution in order to expand the
appeal of socialism. In 1935, the Trotskyists spearheaded a militant mobilization of
working‐class forces and simultaneously aligned themselves with reformist
electoral party politics. Similarly, the Farmer‐Labor Party, much like the New Deal
Democrats, attempted to solidify the loyalty of workers and integrate the political
demands of the labor movement without alienating sympathetic class fractions from
the party. Despite emerging political fractures, a coalition of workers, farmers, and
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middle‐class professionals returned the Farmer‐Labor Party by huge numbers in the
1936 elections. Understanding how the especially volatile labor movement
emerged as a cohesive bloc by 1936 means exploring the political context and
political choices made by labor militants like the Trotskyist teamsters in
Minneapolis.

Local 574 in Exile
The strikes of 1934 for the AFL, according to political scientist Michael
Goldfield, “signified the existence of an emerging mass‐based labor movement led
by radicals, completely outside their control.”96 The militancy of the early 1930s
swelled labor’s depleted ranks, but militancy brought a new body of radical leaders
into positions of union leadership who challenged the cautious conservatism of the
AFL.97 Whatever the hopes for a cooperative relationship between 574 and the
international union, they were shattered by the local’s persistent defiance of IBT
president Daniel Tobin’s orders throughout the tumult of the 1934 trucking strikes.
The subsequent election and appointment of Trotskyist activists Farrell Dobbs, Carl
Skoglund, and Vincent, Grant, and Miles Dunne to key union posts brought tensions
with the IBT to a head in mid‐April of 1935. In a letter to IBT Secretary Treasurer
Thomas Hughes, an apoplectic Tobin declared the Minneapolis local “purely and
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without question controlled by Communists.”98 Tobin, hesitant to predicate his
assault on the local’s Trotskyist leadership entirely on political grounds, forced a
confrontation by citing the local’s failure to pay outstanding per capita taxes on
membership dues owed to the international as well as a host of unspecified
“violations of the [IBT] Constitution.”99 To strengthen his position, Tobin demanded
the Minneapolis Central Labor Union sever its ties to 574 or else he would instruct
the AFL to revoke its charter as well.100 For its part, the local pleaded poverty in the
wake of the 1934 strikes and felt entitled to a reprieve because it received no strike
support from the IBT. Moreover, the leadership saw that the demand for overdue
taxes was little more than a ploy to topple its militant leadership.101 Tobin roundly
rejected any pleas for clemency and castigated the local’s leaders for their
recklessness and disobedience. In a letter to Dobbs, Tobin wrote:
What we do know is that you practically defied not only our International
Union but the entire Labor Movement, by refusing, in the first place, to
request the sanction of the International for your strike; by going out and
attempting to call a General Strike, by soliciting money in our name when the
strike was unauthorized and not approved and in many other ways violating
the contract your local entered into with the International Union when the
charter was issued, which, in substance, is that your local union would be
subject to all the laws of the International and would abide by its rulings and
its decisions.102
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Tobin’s own prudential unionism and personal ambition informed his view
of organized labor as a stabilizing force in American society during times of
economic turmoil. Tobin’s own animus towards strikes dated from his participation
in a failed and violent 1896 Boston streetcar workers strike.103 Militancy and
radicalism, Tobin argued, would only strengthen employer’s opposition, turn public
opinion against unions, and, as happened after the First World War, bring out the
repressive apparatuses of the state against labor. He hoped that electoral politics
could rehabilitate organized labor’s flagging postwar fortunes, shifting his support
from the American Labor Party in 1919 to the independent candidacy of Robert M.
La Follette in 1924, before becoming involved in the Democratic Party with the
candidacy of Al Smith in 1928.104 The IBT president’s malleable partisan
attachments and contingent alliance with the Democratic Party were characteristic
of what historian Julie Greene calls the “pure and simple politics” of the AFL.105 As
the devastation of the Depression bolstered the party’s political fortunes, Tobin
moved solidly into the Democratic camp. He developed a close relationship with
Roosevelt during the 1932 elections while serving as chairman of the Democratic
National Committee’s Labor Bureau (a post he would hold until 1944). Tobin was
one of the only major labor leaders to actively campaign on behalf of Roosevelt that
year, but his emphasis on elite lobbying and negotiation with top party leaders
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meant his efforts probably contributed little to the strong showing of Democrats
among working‐class voters. If anything, Tobin’s campaign work was a rather
naked attempt to secure the post of Secretary of Labor, a job he nevertheless lost to
Frances Perkins.106
Tobin desperately wanted to compensate for his inability to rein in the
Trotskyists during the trucking strikes and protect his reputation in Washington as
a guardian of labor peace by taking a hard stance against the local. To reassert
authority in Minneapolis, he sent in a delegation of IBT officials to charter Local 500
as the official bargaining agent for the city’s drivers. He hoped that disaffiliation
would prompt employers to tear up their contracts with the radicals of Local 574
and sign on with the responsible business unionism of Local 500. Tobin failed to
recognize that it was militant direct action, not business unionism, which ensured
union recognition and the enforcement of signed agreements in the trucking
industry. Fearing a reprise of the previous year’s strikes, few companies dared
renege on their contracts with 574. Those employers that did attempt to take
advantage of the internal teamster dispute to go back on or not renew contracts
were subjected to showpiece job actions that demonstrated the union’s newfound
control over trucking.107 Thus, during March and April, when 574 appeared to be at
its weakest, no major trucking firm broke, or failed to resign, a contract with the
local.
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The revocation of 574’s charter exiled the local teamsters from the IBT and
the AFL’s “House of Labor,” but the local enjoyed an outpouring of support in
Minneapolis. Farrell Dobbs’ was not boasting when he informed IBT Vice President
John Geary, “When you leave here with our charter under your arm, you rest
assured you have got the charter, but we have got the men.”108 Dobbs later
estimated that of Local 574’s roughly 5,000 members, only 50 joined the rival
local.109 Local 574 continued to announce its allegiance to the AFL and reiterated its
eagerness to rejoin the labor federation, while the local remained steadfast in its
condemnation of the IBT’s political attack on militant unions. Tobin, the Trotskyist
leadership charged, was a “splitter” for undertaking a politically motivated attack on
the hard‐won labor solidarity of the Minneapolis labor movement.110 The
effectiveness of the Trotskyists’ direct action tactics and their eagerness to assist
other unions assured Local 574 the allegiance of the local labor movement. Despite
being barred from participating in any AFL organization, the CLU vigorously backed
574.111 Delegates from the CLU, the IAM, and the Building Trades Council
unsuccessfully fought to get the Minnesota State Federation of Labor convention to
urge Tobin to return the local’s charter or to give the floor to representatives from
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574.112 The Saint Paul Trades and Labor Assembly and a host of local unions
likewise adopted resolutions calling for the reinstatement of 574 into the IBT and
the AFL.113 Prefiguring the abandonment of the party’s ultra‐revolutionary Third
Period, the Minnesota section of the Communist Party even went so far as to commit
its cadres to assisting the local’s return to the AFL for the sake of restoring labor
unity.114
Why the local fought to remain within the fold of these two conservative
labor organizations and in the face of such hostility on the surface appears at odds
with the local leadership’s radicalism. This position was consonant with the
emerging Trotskyist strategy of entryism, burrowing within a reformist institution
to transform it into an organ of revolutionary activity. An article in the Trotskyist
newspaper the New Militant applauded Local 574 for “attempting correctly to exist
within the framework of the general labor movement represented by the AF of L.”115
Trotsky ordered his followers to enter existing, organic working‐class organizations
in order to clarify the unfocused militancy of workers into revolutionary action.116
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“The most important of all prerequisites for the development of a militant labor
movement,” James Cannon counseled, “is the leaven of principled communists.”117
Despite being a bulwark of conservative craft unionism, remaining a chartered local
of the IBT connected the Trotskyists to one of the nation’s most powerful unions.
From within the IBT Trotskyist activists hoped to cultivate rank‐and‐file protest and
over time put pressure on Tobin to adopt a more militant stance or even seize
control of the entire union. Rather than retreat to insular dual revolutionary unions
like the Communists, the Trotskyists’ theorized that carving out a place in a genuine
mass organization like the IBT was essential to facilitating the revolutionary
development of the working class.
The Trotskyists’ attempted to build upon the organizational structure of
Local 574 to construct a working‐class political base led by a Leninist vanguard
party and independent of, but not antagonistic to, the FLP. The alarming of victory
of fascism in Germany convinced Trotsky that a “united front” between
revolutionary and reformist parties was necessary to defend working‐class
organizations and advance revolutionary politics. The united front was based on a
conditional alliance with bourgeois and reformist parties to confront the menace of
fascism, but its success depended on the revolutionary leadership of the workers
over other social classes. The petit bourgeoisie and the peasantry, Trotsky argued,
“can have no policy of its own” because its “economic situation” would be defined
either by the proletariat or the bourgeoisie.118 Trotsky outlined a policy of “critical
support” to prevent the subordination of the workers’ revolutionary initiative to the
117
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parliamentary politics. “The united front,” Trotsky wrote, “does not renounce
parliamentary struggle, but utilizes parliament above all to unmask its
impotence.”119 Electoral politics were not to be dismissed, but they meant little
without a powerful mass movement of workers.
The Minneapolis Trotskyists attempted to consolidate the local’s political
autonomy by recruiting militant rank‐and‐file union members into the Communist
League of America. Historian Constance Myers argues that the rigid chain of
command in the vanguard party alienated workers who fought against “industrial
hierarchies and bureaucratism on the job.” Moreover, the party’s dogmatism
silenced internal criticism and produced a “less intense, less creative rebellion
against and critique of capitalist values.”120 Even after the upheavals of 1934 few
workers signed up with the CLA. The majority of the 100‐odd members in the
Communist League’s Minneapolis branch were almost exclusively committed to
trade union work, and rarely, if ever, attended general party meetings.121 The CLA’s
few party workers focused on the party apparatus.122 The creation of the Workers
Party (WP) out of a merger of the Communist League with AJ Muste’s American
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Workers Party (AWP) did little to expand the appeal of Trotskyism among the city’s
workers.
The Trotskyists initiated a policy of critical support for the FLP, backing the
party’s candidates while sharply criticizing the “dangerous illusions of Farmer‐
Laborism.”123 Workers, Trotsky argued, voted reluctantly for reformist candidates
and thus it was the task of the revolutionary to provide alternative leadership.124
Although the Trotskyists admitted that the FLP was an organic manifestation of
working‐class struggle, its heavily petit bourgeois social base posed serious
problems for labor. Without an effective network of party workers the local’s
Trotskyist leaders leaned more heavily on the union itself to influence the politics of
the Farmer‐Labor Party. Through Local 574 the Trotskyists advanced a form of
what historian Rosemary Feurer identifies as “civic unionism,” connecting
workplace conflicts with those facing the working‐class communities.125 They
intended to use the local’s sheer size, organizational wherewithal, and prestige to
mobilize workers behind pro‐labor candidates and to pressure the FLP to expand
relief benefits, pay union scale on all state WPA projects, and to appropriate idle
factories as state‐run enterprises. Moreover, without a nucleus of party activists
working outside the labor movement, the Trotskyists’ brand of civic unionism
almost exclusively stressed issues of specific concern to trade unions. Critical
support for the FLP was geared to protect and advance the interests of organized
labor rather than push the party further left.
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In its first major foray into FLP politics, the local supported the candidacy of
labor attorney and former Socialist Thomas Latimer for mayor of Minneapolis in
June of 1935. The incumbent Republican mayor, A.G. Bainbridge, formerly a
prominent official in the State Federation of Labor, was widely despised by the city’s
workers for the police violence unleashed against pickets during the July 1934
trucking strike.126 A victory for Latimer would be an opportunity for organized
labor to have some real influence within the corridors of City Hall for the first time
since the Socialist administration of Thomas Van Lear almost fifteen year prior. At a
membership meeting of Local 574 in April, Latimer was given a standing ovation
with “thunderous applause” from the 1,000 drivers who came to hear him speak.127
The local pressed what few resources it still had available to assist the Latimer
campaign, but more importantly Local 574 put its reputation among the city’s
workers behind the Farmer‐Labor candidate. Headlines in the Northwest Organizer,
Local 574’s weekly newspaper, exhorted workers to “Remember Bloody Friday” and
demanded “Bainbridge and Bloody [Chief of Police] Mike Johannes must go!”128 The
local implored workers to vote a straight FLP ticket, and warned in no uncertain
terms: “The immediate future of the labor movement is at stake!”129 Latimer
defeated his Republican challenger with solid working‐class support, but not in
significant enough numbers to leave him politically beholden to the labor
movement.
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Latimer was deeply uncomfortable with the teamster leadership’s radicalism
and worried that friction between the militant new direction of the labor movement
and the hard‐line antiunionism of firms organized by the Citizens Alliance would
spark another round of violent strikes. National developments in labor law gave the
new mayor reason to be concerned. In May, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States ruled the NRA unconstitutional. The
tortured career of the NRA had already convinced a number of New Dealers to
rethink the role of unions as agents of economic recovery empowered by federal
labor law.130 Passed three days after the Schechter decision and prompted by the
on‐going militancy of the labor movement, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
better known as the Wagner Act, established a formal legal procedure for the
recognition of trade unions.131 Roosevelt’s own belated interest in giving labor the
right to collectively bargain was intended to clamp down on the industrial
disturbances “burdening or obstructing commerce.”132 Although labor’s right to
organize was enshrined in law, employers continued to fiercely resist New Deal
labor law under the assumption that Wagner too would be ruled unconstitutional.
In Minneapolis, the Citizens Alliance urged its members to resist Wagner’s incursion

Gordon, New Deals, 200.
The argument that mass labor protest prompted the passage of the Wagner Act
has proven controversial. For a breakdown of the debate see Theda Skocpol,
Kenneth Finegold, and Michael Goldfield, “Explaining New Deal Labor Policy,”
American Political Science Review 84 (4) 1990: 1297‐1315.
132 William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, 19321940 (New
York: Harper Colophon Books 1963) 150‐151, 336; quoted in David M. Kennedy,
Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 19291945 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 298.
130
131

55

into the affairs of business.133 Nationally, workers organized themselves to confront
employers and in the mass production industries rallied around the newly formed
Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO).134 In this same spirit, 574 began an
organizing drive to bring the closed shop to all Minneapolis trucking firms while
also assisting the recognition drives of unions in other industries.135 In this heated
atmosphere, Latimer authorized the purchase of machine guns, tear gas, and six
armored cars, ostensibly to thwart bank robberies, but Vincent Dunne protested the
police department’s new acquisitions by pointing out “they can be used to break
strikes too.”136
In the summer of 1935 another strike wave shook Minneapolis. In mid‐July,
IAM Local 1313 stuck the Flour City Ornamental Iron Works, aided by secondary
boycotts and sympathy strikes coordinated by 574.137 Just as the Olson
administration proudly announced the establishment of a publically owned and
cooperatively managed rural electrification program, the new Farmer‐Labor mayor
of Minneapolis deployed police against striking workers.138 Then, on the morning of
July 26, Latimer personally led a detachment of 68 police officers and some 30
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strikebreakers across union picket lines and into the Flour City works.139 Rightly
appalled by Latimer’s brazen disregard for labor solidarity, the Northwest Organizer
demanded that the mayor make “a partial restitution” to organized labor by shutting
down the factory as a “menace to the public peace.”140 Latimer ignored Local 574
and police continued to protect strikebreakers from increasingly hostile strikers
incensed by the mayor’s actions. Violence on the picket lines peaked when police
fired into a crowd of workers gathered to protest the company’s housing of
replacement workers in the plant, killing two bystanders.141 Alongside Flour City, a
strike raged among the hosiery workers at the Strutwear Knitting Mills.142 The
Strutwear firm was even more determined than Flour City’s management to prevent
unionization, and, at the urging of the Citizens Alliance, locked out the workers and
shut down the plant.143 Here too, Local 574 played a crucial role in providing tactical
assistance and strike support for the picketing workers.144 The Strutwear strike
was nearly as violent as Flour City and, most infamously, Vincent Dunne was pulled
by police from the knitters’ picket line and savagely beaten.145
Latimer’s hostility towards militant labor shocked and enraged Local 574,
but the mayor stood committed to restoring labor peace through force and with the
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141 “Two Massacred When Police Protect Lawless Flour City Co.,” Minneapolis Labor
Review, September 13, 1935, 1.
142 “Strike Ranks Growing Fast At Strutwear,” Northwest Organizer August 21, 1935,
1; “Union Strutwear Knitters Stop Production,” Minneapolis Labor Review August 23,
1935, 1.
143 Millikan, A Union Against Unions, 294‐95; Mayer, Floyd B. Olson, 276.
144 Lois Quam and Peter J. Rachleff, “Keeping Minneapolis an Open‐Shop Town: The
Citizens' Alliance in the 1930s,” Minnesota History 50 (3) 1986, 110‐17.
145 “Strike Ranks Growing Fast,” 1.
139
140

57

assistance of conservative labor leaders. In a closed‐door conference in the mayor’s
reception room with officials from the Minnesota State Federation, Latimer agreed
to back Local 500 and declared that police would be used against striking workers
not represented by AFL unions.146 Latimer also announced the creation of a city
Employer‐Employee Board to supplement the federal labor bureaucracy. The
board, composed of representatives of labor and employers appointed by the
mayor, was authorized to arbitrate industrial disputes and declare any work
stoppage illegal.147 574’s executive board emphatically rejected Latimer’s offer to
have one of its officer’s sit on the board, claiming this “artificial agency” was
“usurping the legal rights of union organizations.”148 The local in turn confronted
the FLP over Latimer’s efforts to repress militant labor. “Is this the future accepted
policy of the Farmer‐Labor Party? Was this part of the platform he was elected on?”
asked an editorial in the Northwest Organizer. The local pointed to the 10,000
workers critical to Latimer’s election who were organized into unions independent
of the AFL.
We demand that the Farmer‐Labor Party clarify its position in regard to so‐
called ‘outlaw unions.’ If they do not want the support of workers in these
unions then let them say so plainly. Our future political course will be largely
guided by their actions.149
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The local garnered the support of key FLP ward clubs in Minneapolis. A resolution
presented by the Fifth Ward Club to the Hennepin County Central Committee
asserted that the FLP was “dependent upon the support of all bonafide [sic] labor
organizations regardless of whether or not they are affiliated to the American
Federation of Labor.”150
To complicate matters in both strikes, a group of influential Communist
activists in the Minneapolis IAM locals and among the unemployed challenged the
Trotskyists’ preeminent position among militant workers. The Minnesota CP’s
return to organizing in the mainstream labor movement was a tacit admission of the
failure of the Third Period’s hard‐left sectarianism. Nonetheless, this revived
activity in the AFL unions only further strained solidarity as violent resistance from
employers and the city government intensified.151 Anticipating the international
Communist movement’s official turn to reformism, the Stalinists reached much the
same conclusions as their Trotskyist adversaries: revolutionary politics needed to
be tempered to attract wider support for socialism.152 The CP called on the
Minneapolis FLP administration to uphold its campaign pledges to protect the right
of workers to picket without police interference, increase relief benefits, ensure a
Resolution of the Fifth Ward Farmer‐Labor Club of Minneapolis, no date (ca.
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union pay scales on all public works projects, and investigate labor‐endorsed
aldermen who supported Latimer’s strike‐breaking policies.153 The CP also
proposed to lead the FLP rank‐and‐file and the trade unions behind a “United Labor”
banner to force the Farmer‐Labor leadership to adopt a “class struggle program.”154
In late summer of 1935 the Communists’ critical approach to the FLP was almost
identical to that of the Trotskyists. Politically, the two unions were at odds over the
appropriate relationship of a revolutionary party to the Farmer‐Labor Party. At a
public debate between the Trotskyists and the Communists, CP stalwart Harry
Mayville of the machinists contended that the Farmer‐Labor Party “could be
transformed into a party of class struggle.” Vincent Dunne of the teamsters retorted
that political reliance on Farmer‐Laborism without a labor movement committed to
militant direct action would be a retreat into reformism. 155 Any chance of a
partnership, though, was out of the question as both groups vied to become the
vanguard of Minneapolis’ “masses and toilers.”
Under pressure from the labor movement and the Minneapolis FLP
establishment, Latimer worked to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the strike
wave. Through the Employer‐Employee Board the mayor ordered the Flour City
plant shuttered. Flour City management was forced to recognize the union and
agreed to demands for wage increases and overtime pay, ending a nearly three
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month‐long strike. Olson’s role in the resolution of the strike remains unclear.156 If
he personally pressured Latimer to close the plant it seems likely that he would
have stressed the political importance of recasting the FLP’s role in resolving the
strike. The FLP was eager to rehabilitate its reputation among its working‐class
base while also reassuring its rural and petit bourgeois adherents that the party was
even‐handed in its mediation of social conflict. Yet, in a survey of the city’s working‐
class wards the FLP estimated that only 30 percent of worker voters “were class
conscious and for the strikers.”157 While not an insignificant degree of support, the
limited salience of the strike among the mass of working‐class voters no doubt
reassured FLP leaders anxious to avoid thrusting the party into the middle of a labor
dispute. As a result, neither the governor nor the FLP publically repudiated the
mayor. Instead, Latimer was chastised for his lack of “statesmanship” and for being
so easily manipulated into violent confrontation by the intransigence of the CA and
radical strike leaders.158 Meanwhile, the strike at Strutwear dragged on until April
1936. Latimer’s request for Olson to send in the National Guard to close the factory
led Strutwear management to bring suit in federal court claiming the governor
exceeded his authority. By the time Olson removed the troops from Minneapolis,
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the workers and management reached a settlement that recognized the knitters
union.159
Surprisingly enough AFL President William Green interpreted Olson’s
actions as an endorsement of militant and radical labor. In response, Green took
advantage of the internal dispute within the IBT to begin an all‐out campaign
against militancy and radicalism within the AFL. The upsurge in labor militancy
throughout the AFL over previous two years, prompted Green to write, “[we must]
prevent control of our movement lodging in the hands of Communists.”160 To Green,
the mêlée within the IBT over Local 574 was emblematic of a larger problem with
radicalism faced by the entire AFL. The secretary of the State Federation of Labor
appeared in October before the AFL Executive Committee to provide the federation
with information regarding the extensive network of “Communists” active in the
Minneapolis labor movement, in particular 574 and IAM Locals 382 and 1313.161
Green then dispatched his lieutenant Meyer Lewis to coordinate a so‐called “Red
drive” to root radicals out of the Minnesota labor movement.162 Lewis’ mission to
expose undercover radicals was highly unpopular in Minneapolis, leading many
otherwise moderate and conservative unionists to resent the AFL’s intrusion into
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local affairs and side with Local 574.163 Green’s decision to target radicals was not
even unanimously supported in the AFL, especially not amongst industrial union
leaders in the CIO who were coming to rely heavily upon radical organizers. David
Dubinsky of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union described Lewis’
handling of the Red drive as futile and self‐destructive in a telegram to Green:
“Methods he pursues will not rid the movement of communists, if there are any, but
will destroy the [organized] labor movement.”164 Dubinsky feared that a witch‐hunt
in Minneapolis would only undermine labor solidarity and fuel employers’ antiunion
polemics.
The ongoing crisis in the labor movement between conservative union
leaders and militant rank‐and‐file insurgents threatened to destroy the viable
political coalitions made possible by labor unity. In fall 1935, reports to Olson’s
office described the politically disastrous fallout of a continued rift between 574 and
the IBT and the AFL. Tobin, one Farmer‐Labor advisor reasoned, could only defeat
574 with Latimer’s help. If the IBT president continued to antagonize the local and
if the FLP remained neutral, the Trotskyists would run their own ticket in the 1936
elections and cut into the FLP vote in Minneapolis’ working‐class wards.165 Robley
Cramer, the editor of the Minneapolis Labor Review, telegrammed Farmer‐Labor US
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Senator Henrik Shipstead in Washington to explain the gravity of the situation: “… a
split in labor movement will mean [a] split in [the] political movement and disaster
all along the line.”166 US Congressman Dewey Johnson and several FLP ward clubs
and committees demanded an end to the Red drive in order to restore labor’s
political unity.167 The Hennepin County Farmer‐Labor Central Committee followed
suit and adopted a resolution in support of 574’s reinstatement into the AFL‐ even
though only two months earlier the committee had refused to censure or in any way
officially condemn Latimer for his role in the Flour City strike shootings.168
With the grassroots Farmer‐Labor units in support of the Trotskyist
teamsters and the state party still silent on the issue, the FLP’s longstanding
relationship with the Minnesota State Federation of Labor seemed on the verge of
deteriorating. George Lawson of the State Federation of Labor blamed labor’s
“factional strife” on unionists who deviated from strictly economic issues in favor of
“plans and isms.”169 Lawson also urged Shipstead to accept the AFL’s position that
communists had no legitimate place in the trade unions and push the FLP to come
out more forcibly against militant labor.170 Aside from Latimer (the only Farmer‐
Laborite to address the 1935 state labor convention), the craft federation leaders
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found most of the FLP to be too soft on communism and considered its left‐of‐center
politics too radical. “The bureaucrats of the A.F. of L.’s Internationals are as much
opposed to a Farmer‐Labor Party as they are to the Communists,” wrote an FLP
advisor to Olson’s secretary Vincent Day.171 Lawson lashed out at the Farmer‐Labor
newspaper the Minnesota Leader for criticizing the Red drive and rebuked the FLP
for interfering in labor’s affairs.172 Olson was left on shaky ground as the
Minneapolis FLP stood solidly behind the Trotskyist teamsters while the AFL was
leaning on the state party to take decisive action against labor radicals.
The continuing crisis in the labor movement forced the Trotskyist teamsters
to reevaluate their connection to the FLP. In September, William Brown, the local’s
president, had publically dismissed the FLP as “dead” and threatened to create “a
real producer’s party” if Olson continued to tolerate Latimer’s collusion with
Tobin.173 The Workers Party even went so far as to declare that workers should
withdraw en masse from that FLP.174 Such threats rang hollow, and the local
demanded to know why the FLP simply stood by as one of the key components of its
coalition was being torn apart by the interference of the AFL. The Red drive, the
local concluded, was poised to eviscerate the very unions responsible for so much of
the FLP’s urban support. “The FLP,” the Northwest Organizer pointed out, “has its
base in the unions.”

Letter from Robert Happ to Vincent Day, September 17, 1935, box 1, folder Misc.
correspondence: Robert Happ, 1935‐1936, Day Papers.
172 “Geo. Lawson Hits Out At FLP Paper,” Northwest Organizer, November 27, 1935,
1, 3.
173 Letter from Happ to Day, September 17, 1935, Day Papers.
174 “MPLS. W.P. Shows True Role of F‐L Party,” New Militant, November 9, 1935, 1, 4.
171

65

Most of its support comes from the unions. The Green drive will lop off the
Farmer‐Laborite unionists just as quickly as it attacks other groups. If [the
FLP] stands aside, the Green Machine will cut it to pieces. It must take a firm
stand against the tactics of Meyer Lewis and aid the progressive unions in
defeating him.175
The local argued that the FLP was at its core a labor party, with a mandate to follow
the direction of the trade unions. For the Trotskyists, a labor party was a concrete
expression of what Rosa Luxemburg referred to as the inseparability of trade union
and parliamentary struggle in the development of revolutionary consciousness.176
Moreover, the labor party idea seemed the best possible compromise to
accommodate the necessity of backsliding into class‐collaborationist politics.
Without support from either the local labor movement or from the FLP, the
AFL’s Red drive collapsed. So too did the IBT’s efforts to force out 574’s Trotskyist
leadership. With the support of its rank‐and‐file, the Minneapolis labor movement,
and influential figures and institutions in the FLP, no employer was prepared to
provoke 574 by signing new agreements with 500. Although Local 574 was
committed to advancing industrial unionism, its real priority was to re‐affiliate with
the IBT and the AFL.177 The Trotskyist leadership was adamantly opposed to
fomenting any further division within the labor movement by attempting to move
into the newly formed CIO. Pleas for labor unity did not keep local leaders from
meeting in early 1936 with CIO organizational director John Brophy. Brophy
175
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advised against seeking a CIO charter for fear of exacerbating tensions with the AFL
and the local’s leaders agreed with his advice. Joining the fledgling CIO would have
decimated the local’s sole base of consistent support among the local AFL unions in
the Minneapolis CLU.178
In July of 1936, an emissary from Tobin contacted the local about beginning
reconciliation talks. After three weeks of negotiations between the IBT president
and the local leadership Locals 574 and 500 were merged together as Local 544.179
The result was an uneasy truce between the newly minted 544 and the IBT whereby
officials from Local 500 would be integrated into the local leadership as members on
the executive board and as vice president and secretary treasurer.180 Despite the
presence of Tobin’s allies in a few union leadership posts, the merger itself was a
major concession on the part of Tobin and the AFL. In effect, the creation of 544
legitimized a local organized and led by a cadre of radicals.
Organized labor was faced with a number of crucial choices by 1936, but
abstaining from involvement in the political process was no longer one. Two years
of militant struggle were beginning to make the union shop and collective
bargaining concrete realities for thousands of Minneapolis workers, but maintaining
this new system of industrial relations hinged upon active government support of
organized labor. The initial problems with ensuring compliance with labor law,
coupled with organized labor’s lingering discomfort with relying on state
intervention, meant that labor needed to continue taking an aggressive stance
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against employers. Labor militancy had proved practical on the picket line and it
forced the state to take seriously both the shop floor and political grievances of
workers. In this context, the appeal of voluntarism and strict nonpartisanship was
beginning to wane. Having beaten Tobin and survived Green’s Red drive, the local
did not abandon Farmer‐Labor politics. Rather, the increased political profile of
militant labor reinforced the Trotskyists’ vision of increasing the power of trade
unions over the FLP. At the same time, the turmoil within the Minnesota labor
movement led the FLP to begin a critical revaluation of its political relationship with
organized labor. Fearful of future fragmentation in the labor movement, not to
mention the estrangement of rural and middle‐class voters from the Farmer‐Labor
banner, the FLP’s leadership attempted to limit the political intervention of
organized labor.

The FarmerLabor Party and the Popular Front
Throughout 1935, the international Communist movement was in a moment
of transition. In Minnesota and elsewhere, party members slowly shed the
strictures of the Third Period with a return to collaborating with liberal, reform‐
oriented working‐class organizations. In response to the failure of the CP’s ultra‐
revolutionary approach to attract working‐class support, the “Popular Front” was
officially inaugurated at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist
International in the summer of 1935 to build broad cross‐class alliances with
socialist and liberal bourgeois parties and trade unions in common cause against the
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rise of fascism.181 Under the Popular Front the CP sought to enter the mainstream of
American politics as the left wing of the New Deal coalition. The CP, General
Secretary Earl Browder proudly declared, “became the most single‐minded practical
reformist party that America ever produced.”182 Internally the CP remained a
rigidly hierarchical vanguard party driven by ideological dogmatism, replacing the
fetishization of revolution with the fetishization of liberal reform. The “political
turn” of the Popular Front embraced electoral politics and the gradual reform of
capitalism, relinquishing any pretense about being a revolutionary party. The
planks of the Popular Front’s program was essentially a left‐leaning variation of
what the New Deal ultimately achieved, e.g. public works projects, relief for farmers,
and collective bargaining.183 Communist cadres returned to the AFL unions and
most significantly surged into CIO organizing campaigns in the mass production
industries. Initially, Popular Front Communists were opposed to the Democratic
Party and eagerly sought entry into state‐level third party politics.184 Progressive,
labor, and farmer‐labor parties in Wisconsin, New York, and Minnesota, the CP
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reasoned, were the ideal platforms to launch a national and more authentically
working‐class alternative to the Democrats.185
Prior to the official shift in international Communist strategy, the Minnesota
CP had already begun moving into the FLP. In a resolution passed by the
Communist Party Central Committee in August 1935, the party leaders claimed a
sharp “class differentiation” was emerging in Minnesota between the “leftward
moving” workers and small farmers and the “official leaders, trade union reformists,
and the bourgeois politicians” of the FLP. While the resolution noted that workers
and farmers were not yet ready to accept the Communist Party outright, the new
platform ordered party members to work within the FLP to isolate its reactionary
leadership as well as “demagogues” like the Trotskyists.186 By September
Communists were joining the FLP and from within the organization denounced
Latimer and Olson.187 The growing influence of the CP troubled the Farmer‐Labor
leadership. At a meeting organized by the CP to protest the police killings during
the Flour City strike, an FLP advisor estimated that over half of the more than 400
people in attendance were “active rank‐and‐file members of our own party.”188 The
next month, Olson met with Earl Browder and the governor agreed to secretly allow
CP members back into the FLP.189 The CP ceased its attacks on Olson and stopped
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running its own candidates for office in Minnesota. Although the CP was very small
in Minnesota‐ one estimate put membership at only 1,000 in the 1930s‐ these
cadres became some of the most diligent and dedicated members of the FLP.190 The
influx of disciplined and hard‐working CP cadres loyal to Olson helped the governor
strengthen his position against the FLP’s competing factions.191
The Communists reentered Farmer‐Labor politics just as Olson was
struggling to keep labor factionalism from dulling the party’s electoral edge. As
much as the revival of the labor movement in Minneapolis mobilized workers
behind the FLP, the movements’ militancy appeared to undermine Farmer‐
Laborism’s claim to be advocating “peaceful and orderly change.”192 Olson was most
concerned with how to make left‐of‐center politics appealing to a diversity of class
fractions and not strictly workers. However, the FLP’s 1934 losses in rural counties
and slipping numbers in key urban wards made keeping the party’s base in
organized labor intact an urgent matter for the party as a whole. As the labor
movement was splintering over 574’s feud within the IBT, the AFL’s Red drive, and
Latimer’s handling of the 1935 strike wave, Olson realized that the coordinating
body of the FLP’s statewide party, the Farmer‐Labor Association, needed to be
insulated from labor factionalism. This was problematic because trade unionists
York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 259. Olson’s accord with Browder proved
wrong Trotsky’s 1932 prediction that, given the CP’s failure to wed itself to the
embryonic farmer‐labor movement in the early 1920s, “it would have less
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comprised the bulk of the association’s membership. Before 1933, 6,000 to 8,000
trade unionists were dues paying members of the Farmer‐Labor Association when
total membership was only about 10,000. Even when membership grew to 20,000
in 1934 and the number of union members in the Farmer‐Labor Association
remained static, the unions were still the association’s most organized grouping.193
The CP’s relative isolation from the controversies in the local labor
movement made the Communists an even more attractive partner for Olson. The
tremendous growth of the CP nationally and in Minnesota through the 1930s was
accompanied by a steady deproletarianization as middle‐class professionals
progressively began to outnumber industrial workers.194 Despite party
pronouncements (echoing those of the Trotskyists) calling for the transformation of
the FLP into “real class struggle party” led by the militant trade unions, the
Minnesota CP had no formal authority over any major Minneapolis trade union.195
The party’s historic inability to construct a leadership network on the shop floor no
doubt influenced the Popular Front’s turn towards reformist electoral politics.196
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The lack of a mass base made the party entirely dependent on an FLP leadership
that did not want to publicize their connections to the CP. The alliance with the FLP,
one Communist organizer grumbled, “was more or less a relationship with the top,
very secretive not only to the masses at large, but even to our membership and
sympathizers.”197 The CP’s disciplined and efficient organization afforded the party
privileged access to the FLP and even remade some party members into Farmer‐
Labor elites. Despite such influence, the CP was in no position to stake out an
independent political course. The CP’s longstanding practice of democratic
centralism in decision‐making and the Popular Front’s ideological fealty to
reformism meant that the Communists generally deferred to FLP policy.
Furthermore, since the Communists relied almost exclusively on sympathetic
Farmer‐Laborites for support and protection, they could not easily defy their
patrons.
With the approval of Olson, Communists moved into the ward clubs and
county and district committees of the Farmer‐Labor Association that had been
neglected by the “pure and simple” AFL trade unionists and the Trotskyists.198
These small and often understaffed organs offered the Communists and their liberal
allies a perfect entry point to assume control over powerful Farmer‐Labor
Association structures like the Hennepin County Central Committee.199 Olson was
willing, if not eager, to integrate the CP into the FLP because as a disciplined core of
Quoted in Haynes, Dubious Alliance, 19.
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operatives Communist cadres could help advance the governor’s policies within the
Farmer‐Labor movement at the all important district and state conventions. In
effect, Olson’s recruitment of the CP was an effort to transform the FLP organization
from a mass‐based party into a constituent party “neither structured nor widely
perceived as a cohesive policy link between voters and officials.”200 Although union
members were still a sizeable group in the Farmer‐Labor Association, according to
Article IV of the association’s constitution the maximum number of delegates a trade
union or other affiliated group could send to party conventions was pegged at three
in order to prevent any one group from commandeering the proceedings.201
Communists and Popular Front liberals in turn remade standing associations into
front groups and created whole new paper organizations, such as the Bulgarian‐
Macedonian Workers Club and the Rosa Luxemburg League, to outflank trade union
opposition. Local 544, with its three delegates for 5,000 members, was, to say the
least, seriously underrepresented at Farmer‐Labor conventions.
Olson’s alliance with the Communist Party highlighted the problem of labor
factionalism. While Olson could have looked to farm groups to help minimize union
power, that would have only exacerbated divisions in the Farmer‐Labor movement
between rural and urban voters. Warren Creel, Secretary of the Farmer‐Labor
Association’s Educational Bureau, claimed that Communist cadres were in a unique
position to drive the unions out of the Farmer‐Labor Association while cementing
the loyalty of union voters for FLP candidates. Speaking from the clubs and
Walter Dean Burham, Critical Elections and the Mainspring of American Politics
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1970), 9.
201 Constitution of the FarmerLabor Association of Minnesota adopted March 20,
1925.
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committees of the Farmer‐Labor Association, Communists and Popular Front
liberals urged union workers to demand the disaffiliation of their trade unions from
the Farmer‐Labor Association as a protest against petit bourgeois and antilabor
politicians like Latimer. The CP’s alternative was for the trade unions to create
separate political committees to endorse progressive Farmer‐Labor candidates and
mobilize union members on election days.202 Such proposals carried little weight
among the rank‐and‐file and organized labor did not desert the Farmer‐Labor
Association en masse until after the defeats of 1938. The integration of the CP
spelled out the Farmer‐Labor leadership’s revised attitude towards organized labor:
the function of the unions was simply to get workers to the polls, not to dictate
policy and risk the balkanization of the FLP. Without a trade union base, the
Communists implicitly seconded Olson’s stance that the political role of workers
was at the ballot box, voting for progressive Farmer‐Labor candidates.
In the last months of 1935 and throughout most of 1936 the CP was still
quietly establishing itself within the FLP, but the Trotskyists understood the FLP’s
tentative move into a Popular Front coalition as a threat to their own political
influence. The Trotskyists agreed in part with CP that the widening gap between
organized workers and the career‐minded petit bourgeois FLP politicians was the
party’s real problem.203 Instead of engaging directly in FLP politics like the
Stalinists, the Trotskyists attempted to shore up their position of leadership within
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the labor movement by forming an organized left bloc in the CLU.204 The Trotskyists
also returned to building a political base outside the FLP as James Cannon
negotiated the mass entrance of Workers Party members into the decaying Socialist
Party.205 The Trotskyists’ expectation that a rejuvenated and radicalized SP could
pressure the FLP further left, but hopes for this plan were quickly dashed. The state
SP chapter forcefully resisted the assimilation of the WP, crippling the Trotskyists’
ability to appropriate and revive the dormant Socialist organization.206 Once again,
the Trotskyists were left to rely almost solely on the local union to influence
Farmer‐Labor politics.
The fundamental difference between the politics of the Trotskyists and the
Communists was not ideological, but over how to gain access to institutions of
power. The CP, with Olson’s blessing, rose through the FLP’s grassroots
organizational networks to wield influence over party policy while the Trotskyists’
focused on the trade union affiliates to the Farmer‐Labor Association. For the time
being, this difference in political spheres of operation contained the conflict
between the CP and the Trotskyists. The defeat of the AFL’s anti‐radical purges
solidified the political position of the Communists and the Trotskyists while also
making both groups aware of the need to close ranks behind the FLP to stave off
conservative counterattacks. Political unity for organized labor appeared to be at
hand.
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The Apogee of FarmerLaborism
The divisions within the Farmer‐Labor movement were clear: craft and
industrial unionists, New Deal Democrats, Republicans, Communists, Socialists, a
slew of other radicals and militants, and a growing rank‐and‐file largely new to
electoral politics.207 In a few years time these elements would carve the labor
movement up into competing factions. However, in 1936 the extent of labor’s
successes on the shop floor, in statehouses, and in Washington was still so new and
shocking that existing tensions were dwarfed by the extraordinary political
possibilities before organized labor. Rumblings for a national farmer‐labor or labor
party to challenge the Democrats were quieted in 1936 as the various agents of
working‐class politics joined together to support Roosevelt’s bid for reelection. The
possibility of a retrenchment of liberal progress, animated by fears of homegrown
populism and fascism, united these groups behind the New Deal Democrats and
their third‐party allies at the state level. In Minnesota, the multifaceted struggle to
solidify collective bargaining in Minneapolis exposed the internal and external
forces that could lay waste to the labor movement and the FLP. The 1936 campaign
was a moment when the key actors in labor and on the left united behind a drive to
stem a conservative backlash against the New Deal.
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The election campaign began with the fanfare typical of previous election
seasons, but this campaign was about protecting the liberal reform of the past four
years from a rearguard assault.208 Olson described the contemporary political
climate as a contest between liberals and reactionaries. “In politics,” he wrote, “the
liberal logically belongs with parties seeking the establishment of a new social
order.” The reactionary, on the other hand, “refuses to admit that conditions have
undergone a radical change” and insists upon reestablishing an outmoded social
order. Real liberal change, Olson declared, could only be achieved by radicalism,
confronting the problems of society at their roots (the radix) in order to create a
more just and equitable world.209 Reactionaries were nothing more than harbingers
of fascism because their politics reinforced the hierarchies of the old society while
repressing the social forces straining to create a new society. Olson’s left‐leaning
interpretation of liberalism was distinct from Marxist interpretations of class
struggle. In an interview with journalist Charles Walker, Olson complained that the
left failed to grasp the essential conservatism of American political culture. “The
problem with these leftists and ritualists‐ they want to ride on a white horse with a
pennant flying hell bent for the barricades. My method is a different one. ‘Boring
from within,’ which I learned from the old Wobblies.”210 Farmer‐laborism, Olson
contended, was the ideal combination of progressive liberalism, acknowledging the
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need for radical change while moderating demands for social upheaval to fit within
the political institutions of capitalist democracy.
Olson announced in January of 1936 his decision to run for the US Senate.
The battle for the FLP’s gubernatorial nomination was set between urban Popular
Front liberals and rural agrarians. Elmer Benson, the former state Commissioner of
Securities who Olson appointed to serve out the remaining term of an open senate
seat, was the favorite of the party’s progressive and Popular Front factions. Benson,
a relative unknown who had never held an elected office, was a close ally of the
governor, enjoyed the support of the FLP’s weekly newspaper the Minnesota Leader,
and enthusiastically welcomed a partnership with the CP.211 His opponent was
Hjalmar Petersen, a country newspaper editor who rose through the FLP ranks to
become lieutenant governor to provide a rural balance to Olson’s ticket. Although
Petersen represented the FLP’s more conservative rural wing suspicious of militant
urban labor, he nevertheless went along with Olson’s decision to align the FLP with
the CP.212 The nominating convention was expected to be highly contentious since
Olson, suffering from stomach cancer, would not be in attendance to moderate the
proceedings.
Blaming an overly ambitious social democratic agenda for the setbacks of the
1934 elections, the 1936 state convention gutted the much of the party’s radical
platform while nevertheless giving radicals a voice in the deliberations. Despite
grumblings by many Farmer‐Laborites, forty CP delegates, complimented by
Haynes, Dubious Alliance, 18‐20.
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another hundred Popular Front liberals, were seated and constituted a sizeable bloc
in a convention of 667 delegates. In vain, a livid Thomas Laitmer bemoaned the
replacement of “old‐time Farmer‐Laborites” by communist agents.213 The trades
and labor assemblies of Duluth and St. Paul shared Latimer’s frustration and
demanded that 574’s two delegates not be seated at the upcoming state FLP
convention because the local was not a part of the AFL and for the leadership’s ties
to “Communism.”214 In the end 574’s delegates were seated with little protest, but
proposals put forth by Trotskyist delegates calling for an FLP endorsement of a WPA
workers’ organizing drive and a plan for the state to appropriate idle factories for
unemployed workers were both roundly rejected. 215 Standard FLP support for the
public ownership of industry and natural resources was excised and replaced by an
intentionally vague scheme known as “Planned Plenty” to downplay the FLP’s
socialist roots.216 The convention sidestepped the contentious issue of creating a
national farmer‐labor party to challenge Roosevelt, a core Communist issue, by
refusing to take a stand one way or another on the matter.217 The state convention’s
revisions of party certainly frustrated the FLP’s leftwing, but it also demonstrated
the extent of the Trotskyists and Stalinists commitment to accepting the
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compromises inherent to parliamentary politics. Both groups left the convention
prepared to fully support the FLP platform and candidates.218
A relative unknown when he entered the convention, Benson proved popular
among the delegates thanks to Olson’s endorsement and managed to win the
nomination for governor.219 Benson’s campaign toned down the radical rhetoric
previous campaigns and actively connected the FLP and the New Deal after Olson
publically endorsed Roosevelt.220 Benson reminded working‐class voters of the
need for increased state intervention in economic and social policy to tackle the
Depression. “Our workers,” he avowed, “want to know whether the government will
solve for them and for their children the nightmare of economic insecurity, with its
threat of hunger, want, and degradation.”221 Benson applauded New Deal reforms,
especially those won for organized labor, but he warned workers: “If we lose this
Election, then our cause will be lost for many years.”222 The FLP platform attacked
Republican plans to institute a state sales tax and denounced the incursion of chain
stores into the state economy. The specter of fascism was ever‐present in the
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Benson campaign to underscore the seriousness of the election. “It is but a step
from the reactionary philosophy of the Republican Party,” Benson warned, “to
reactionary dictatorship.”223 American fascist groups like the Black Legion and the
Silver Shirts, the FLP alleged, were expanding their ranks and even preparing for a
putsch against a victorious liberal administration.224 The stakes in 1936 were
higher than ever, Benson and the FLP claimed, because the opposition fully
understood the strength of progressive liberalism and would stop at nothing to see
such a powerful coalition crushed.
The death of Floyd Olson from cancer in August did not derail the momentum
of the FLP campaign; if anything it only contributed to its forward surge. Over
150,000 Minnesotans came out to mourn the late governor as he lay in state in St.
Paul.225 In death Olson was practically canonized as the patron saint of the FLP,
transforming a complicated and ambitious politician into a popular (and pliable)
icon for the left. To workers, Olson was the Farmer‐Labor Party, and even harsh
critics like the Trotskyists made the tactful and politically judicious decision to
honor the late governor. The Northwest Organizer’s obituary for Olson made no
mention of the 1934 strikes, and instead praised him “as an unswerving champion
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of the underprivileged and exploited.”226 Olson’s death further accentuated the
Trotskyist teamsters’ steady move away from outspoken revolutionary politics
towards a greater accord with the FLP. The Trotskyist leadership of the local
warned against any “unprincipled struggle for the crown of the dead leader” to
prevent the Republicans or the Democrats from taking advantage of party
dissension.227 The need for labor and political solidarity was not lost on the
Trotskyists, who once again swallowed their revolutionary principles and accepted
Farmer‐Laborism out of political necessity.
Still the Northwest Organizer issued a highly qualified endorsement of the
FLP in September of 1936. “In Minnesota the abstract question of how workers
should vote is a simple one.” The political duty of workers was to support
“whatever political movement most closely represents his economic needs” and in
turn “mold it into a weapon” to “fight in the interests of the exploited.”228 The
editorial urged the readership, who “no doubt range from Communists to
Republicans,” to vote a straight FLP ticket. Even if the FLP lacked the credentials of
a genuine working‐class party, at the very least it was “a political party to which
labor unions are directly affiliated.”229 Still smarting from the betrayals of the
Latimer administration, the Trotskyists urged workers to vote Farmer‐Labor while
pointedly reminding the party that working‐class support depended upon the
actions of its elected representatives. The Trotskyists hoped that in the election the
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trades unions could bring enough voters to the polls to pressure the Farmer‐
Laborite to live up to its campaign promises and in turn increase union power
within the FLP.
The FLP under Benson as under Olson was also wary of the political
intervention of organized labor. Benson and the party’s other candidates were
sensitive to Republican charges that the FLP was a radical labor party responsible
for the strikes and industrial turmoil that shook the state over the preceding two
years. “The answer that the Farmer‐Labor Party should make to this dastardly
conniving,” the Northwest Organizer declared, “is to come out wholesale in support
of striking workers and answer the slander of the reactionary politicians by saying
openly that the Farmer‐Labor Party DOES support the economic organization of the
workers.”230 But, as in 1934, the FLP adamantly resisted accusations that it was a
front for organized labor. Its candidates paraphrased the preamble to the Wagner
Act by stating that only legally sanctioned collective bargaining could end present
state of “industrial war.”231 It was the continued opposition of employers and the
GOP to collective bargaining that was the root cause of labor disputes, forcing
workers to assume a more militant stance to win their legal right to union
representation.232 Instances of labor violence were the result of capital’s senseless
resistance to unions; it was employers who provoked labor “riots” by using hired
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thugs and, if possible, the police to disrupt peaceful pickets.233 Labor militancy was
the inevitable outcome of reactionary politics, and the only option for peace was to
accept the reality of class conflict and mediate it through the state institutions.
In an attempt to convince conservative Farmer‐Laborites and moderate
Democrats to vote Republican, Minnesota Republicans described themselves as the
only liberal party in the state, blasting the New Deal and painting unions as the
incubators of communist revolution.234 The FLP retorted that Republicans were
merely classical liberals interested only in advancing the interests of the capitalist
class.235 “The issue in Minnesota is not communism, nor is it socialism,” the
Minnesota Leader explained. The real issue of the election was the Republican
Party’s eagerness to compensate for the failures of Hoover by adopting the
trappings of fascism.236 Republican Red‐baiting failed to gain traction in large part
because the base of the FLP as well as its leading figures were united behind the
party’s candidate for governor. In this context Republican attacks rang hollow
because they did not resonate with serious divisions lingering within the FLP’s
ranks or among liberal voters. Organized labor stood united behind the AFL and the
State Federation Labor convention in September passed resolutions endorsing the
entire FLP slate and Roosevelt.237 In exchange for the FLP’s support of Roosevelt,
the state’s Democratic candidates for governor, the senate, and congress bowed out
233
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of the election to prevent splitting the liberal vote.238 The CP reversed its opposition
to Roosevelt and gave up on a third party campaign, but avoided explicitly
endorsing the president and instead the party directed its invective against the
Republican Party.239 Therefore, the unity of organized labor, the surrender of the
state’s Democrats, the collapse of a national farmer‐labor party foreclosed the major
potential rifts in the urban Farmer‐Labor coalition.
The Democratic landslide across the country reelected Roosevelt by more
than eleven million votes. The president was accompanied back into office by a
solid contingent of New Dealers in the House and Senate as well as governors in key
industrial states like Michigan and Pennsylvania. Trade unions became more than
simply economic organizations as labor protest helped to mobilize political action
behind “latent working‐class sentiments.”240 Democratic politics linked working‐
class interests with those of other class fractions, minimizing the effect of class
polarization on the Democratic vote, but issues most relevant to labor occupied
much of the campaign agenda.241 Heightened labor militancy greatly increased the
political profile of industrial workers and convinced Roosevelt to reach out to the
burgeoning CIO and the nearly four million workers it was organizing into industrial
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unions leading up to the 1936 elections.242 The creation in 1936 of the CIO’s
political arm, Labor’s Non‐Partisan League (LNPL), mobilized millions of workers
behind the Democrats, in many cases for the very first time. William Leuchtenberg
argues that the LNPL was essential to bringing Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and
Pennsylvania out for Roosevelt and the Democrats.243 New Deal Democrats were
the logical allies of industrial mass production workers because after the passage of
the Wagner Act the Roosevelt administration appeared willing to at least nominally
incorporate working‐class organizations in the political project of reviving the
economy.244 The labor upheavals of the early 1930s proved to workers and labor
leaders alike that unions could be constructed from “below,” but not sustained
without some kind of assistance from the state.245
Along with the resounding reelection of Roosevelt, the November elections
brought the FLP its most sweeping victories thanks also to organized labor. In the
governor’s race Benson trounced his Republican opponent by 250,000 votes, at that
time the largest margin of victory for any governor in Minnesota history. Benson
won big in the Twin Cities’ counties of Hennepin and Ramsey and on the Iron Range,
but he also picked up a significant number of votes in rural areas that had rejected
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Olson in 1934.246 For the first time the FLP won decisive control of the state house
of representatives, and both US senators and five of the state’s nine US
representatives were Farmer‐Laborites, with a sixth missing by only 300‐odd
votes.247 For the FLP, the election results signified “a revolution… achieved in
America through the ballot‐ a bloodless revolution carried out in the truest and
noblest traditions of this country.”248 The progressive turn in New Deal legislation,
coupled with the fear of rightwing backlash against Roosevelt, led the FLP to
downplay its socialistic planks, renounce its national third party aspirations, and
unite organized labor. The once apprehensive State Federation of Labor
enthusiastically endorsed Roosevelt and the entire FLP slate at its annual
convention.249 The Trotskyist teamsters urged voters to “Keep faith with Floyd” and
staged mass rallies on behalf of Farmer‐Labor candidates. After the elections,
though, they counseled workers to remain watchful of the FLP and remain steadfast
in adhering to a militant trade union policy.250 At the end of day, though, the local
and indeed the labor movement as a whole, was left with no choice but to continue
to endorse the FLP.
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Conclusion
1935 was a year of victories for the Trotskyist teamsters and the Minneapolis
labor movement. Insurgent, rank‐and‐file militancy galvanized the disparate
strands of worker protest into a social movement, but this new movement was also
exposed to array of new political pressures. The Trotskyists, isolated from the
mainstream labor movement and frustrated by their lack of success in creating a
political alternative to the FLP, were reluctantly compelled to rely on sympathetic
Farmer‐Laborites in the face of overt hostility from the IBT, the AFL, and Mayor
Latimer. Fearful of future fragmentation in the labor movement, not to mention the
estrangement of other social groups and class fractions from the Farmer‐Labor
banner, the FLP’s leadership sought to limit the political intervention of organized
labor. However, from 1935 to 1936 the Farmer‐Labor Party, like the New Deal
Democrats, successfully managed to keep schisms in the labor movement from
compromising the party’s winning electoral coalition. Two years later the FLP and
the Democrats would find themselves both overcome by an unraveling of the very
forces responsible for such spectacular wins. The fall of the Popular Front‐aligned
FLP was precipitated by the outbreak of a “civil war” between the AFL and CIO,
exacerbated by intensifying internal party conflicts between the Trotskyists and the
Communists. Into the breach stepped a new variety of liberal Republicans willing to
accommodate key aspects of New Deal social policy, including legal protections for
collective bargaining, while rallying voters against the militant and politicized labor
movement responsible for much of the New Deal coalition’s early electoral success.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CONTESTED TERRAIN OF LIBERALISM

Finding Labor’s Place in the Second New Deal
The two years following the landslide reelection of Roosevelt and the success
of New Deal Democrats and their allies in the Minnesota FLP defined the longterm
meaning of the New Deal. At stake in 1937 and 1938 was the very nature of New
Deal reform. After 1936 a new order in American politics was emerging, torn
somewhere between liberal and social democratic politics. Building a Democratic
political order, according to political scientist David Plotke, required a major
mobilization of diverse social groupings and organizations united by “a durable
configuration of institutions and discourses.”251 The early fluidity of New Deal
politics opened a space for radicals and liberals to intermingle, allowing the latter to
freely criticize the capitalist social order and the former to pursue social reform.252
The experimental nature of New Deal reforms gave the Democrats a flexible
platform from which to appeal to the votes of a “a cross‐class coalition of
ideologically contradictory elements.”253 The elections of 1932 and 1936 cemented
a realignment of American politics in favor of the Democrats, but what remained
disputed was exactly how the New Deal coalition would reshape national politics.
Although the key legislation of the second New Deal (the Wagner Act, Social Security
Act, etc.) was passed prior to November 1936, the mobilization of social forces for
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and against liberal reform must be given closer scrutiny in the aftermath of the
general election.254 It was the political conflict between labor and capital (and their
respective intra‐class conflicts) in the industrial north in 1937 and 1938 that
determined each side’s longterm ability to alter the Democratic political order for
the next 30 years
The crisis of the Depression opened the space for innovative new political
strategies to put working‐class politics at the center of the New Deal. Organized
labor’s entry into mass politics, especially through the CIO, represented an insurgent
social movement of northern industrial workers competing against other organized
social forces for state‐level influence, specifically corporate industrial capitalists.255
Yet the labor movement was at odds with itself over how to wield its newfound
political influence. The expulsion of the CIO unions from the AFL in 1936
underscored the rival ideological foundations of craft and industrial unionism in the
midst of the New Deal. As historian Christopher Tomlins notes, “the decisive role in
constructing the United States’ modern industrial relations regime belonged to the
liberal bureaucratic‐administrative state.”256 The AFL’s enduring commitment to
craft distinctions, anti‐statism, and a decentralized organizational structure,
ensured the federation’s unwillingness to abandon nonpartisanship by establishing
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institutional ties with the ruling New Deal Democratic Party.257 The CIO embraced
the social Keynesians who advocated a national labor relations regime to foster
unionism and increase the purchasing power of workers and in the broader context
of a welfare state. Nevertheless, despite the “organic” relationship between the CIO
and the second New Deal, the relative weakness of the new industrial unions meant
that the CIO needed Roosevelt and the Democratic Party far more than either
needed the CIO.258 The labor movement was split at precisely the moment when it
could have exerted the most pressure on a New Deal state still in the process of
finding its bearings. Organized labor’s pivotal place in the New Deal coalition was
divided into two competing interests with conflicting organizational needs and
ideological underpinnings.
This tension was expressed most clearly at the state level in the industrial
north where labor protest and political organization initiated a new reform‐oriented
political order. Triumphant New Deal state governments tried hard to keep
together the vital working‐class voting bloc at the core of the new realignment, but
these efforts to reconcile labor factionalism often appeared to privilege insular,
often jurisdictional struggles between competing factions of the labor movement.
The result strained the New Deal’s relationship with the other social classes and
class fractions that made the victories of 1936 possible. Although the industrial
heartland continued to vote in large numbers for Roosevelt in 1940 and 1944, the
cross‐class coalition that elected the Minnesota Farmer‐Labor Party, the Progressive
Party in Wisconsin, and New Deal Democrats in Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania
257
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splintered and paved the way for Republican victories in 1938.259 Nevertheless, by
the late 1930s the working‐class politics at the heart of the New Deal achieved a
social salience beyond industrial workers. The discord rending the labor movement
and the New Deal Democrats and their third party allies did not shatter the
widespread support for the New Deal. The Republican Party reversed almost a
decade’s worth of political defeats in the industrial north by accommodating the
statism of the New Deal and marginalizing hard‐line anti‐New Dealers. Accepting
aspects of the New Deal gave Republicans entrée into Democratic industrial
strongholds by appealing to urban voters who favored a restrained form of New
Deal‐styled state intervention. This moderate liberalism also gave the GOP the
ability to criticize the supposed excesses of the New Deal, principally its strong
connection with an insurgent, politicized labor movement. In this new order,
though, liberal Republicans made astounding ideological concessions, like
acknowledging the legitimacy of organized labor, which sustained the basic thrust of
New Deal liberalism. The midterm elections 1938 became a critical moment to
define the New Deal as a program and an idea. A fruitful way to unpack this
complex process is by looking at the political context of individual industrial states.
With a ruling left‐of‐center Farmer‐Labor Party and a politicized labor movement
with strong radical leadership, Minnesota offers an extreme, but no less revealing,
example of how organized labor’s internal and external conflicts shaped the course
of New Deal liberalism at the crucial juncture of 1937 and 1938.

Two exceptions are the victories of Wendell Wilkie in Michigan in 1940 and
Thomas Dewey in Wisconsin in 1944.
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FarmerLaborism Divided
In Minnesota newly elected Governor Elmer Benson interpreted the
landslide of 1936 as an opportunity to move state politics in a more radical
direction. Benson’s ambitious legislative goals included the creation of state‐owned
cooperatives, a state planning board, a ban on the use of strikebreakers, repeal of
the World War One‐era criminal syndicalism law, and a sharply increased
progressive income tax to “soak the rich.”260 It was clear that Benson’s radical
convictions were considerably more sincere than those held by his predecessor.
“Floyd Olson used to say these things,” exasperated Minneapolis industrialist John S.
Pillsbury allegedly fumed, “but this sonofabitch believes them.”261 Nevertheless, like
Olson before him, Benson remained nervous that the majority of Minnesota voters
would support a legislative agenda further to the left of the New Deal. The governor
and his advisors reasoned the FLP’s left wing needed to neutralize conservative
opposition and ensure greater party discipline in order to make a compelling case
for an explicitly social democratic program. Significantly, Benson not only
continued but also expanded the FLP’s alliance with the Communist Party,
effectively remaking his administration into a Popular Front government.262 He was
deeply impressed both by the program of the Popular Front and the cadre of young,
well educated, and hard‐working CP members who immersed themselves in the
daily work of the FLP. He appointed Communists to posts in numerous state
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agencies, giving the new governor a loyal and energetic cadre and the Communists
real bureaucratic power.263 At Communist Party General Secretary Earl Browder’s
insistence, Communist Farmer‐Laborites were instructed not to act as an
independent bloc but strictly as a loyal, pro‐Benson caucus within the FLP.264 The
Communists exercised their newfound power as partisans first and foremost against
the governor’s critics in the party, particularly those in the trade unions where the
CP still lacked a genuine base.
Animated by left sectarianism, intense internal party conflict erupted as the
trade unions and Popular Front Farmer‐Laborites attempted to assert their
authority over the FLP’s powerful Hennepin County Central Committee. In early
March 1937, the Central Committee organized a nominating convention to find a
candidate to replace the unpopular incumbent Thomas Latimer in the upcoming
Minneapolis mayoral election. Mayor Latimer thoroughly polarized the Minneapolis
FLP with his efforts to repress the 1935 summer strike wave, a fact not lost on
representatives from the 96 trade unions and railroad brotherhoods in attendance
at the convention.265 Even though the majority of the assembled delegates were
solidly opposed to Latimer, the recent election of a Popular Front bloc to the county
organization’s executive committee galvanized a minority faction around the
embattled incumbent against the marginalization of labor by “Communist
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infiltrators.”266 Forced to choose between participating in a convention run by
Popular Fronters or link arms with Latimer, the Trotskyists opted to back Latimer.
The Latimer faction announced the formation of rump convention at the Central
Labor Union hall, bringing together the Trotskyists with their erstwhile enemies in
the State Federation of Labor and the rightwing of the FLP at the head of 400 mostly
labor delegates.267 A committee sent to the CLU hall at Benson’s behest was met
with a caustic rebuke from Trotskyist Miles Dunne who stated that the rump
convention would not compromise with the “reactionary policies of political
adventurers.” Dunne went on to denounce the governor’s secretary Roger Rutchick,
as well as the chair and vice‐chair of the CLU and the co‐chairs the Hennepin Central
Committee, as “Communist stooges.” The rump convention unanimously nominated
Latimer and passed a motion to withdraw all delegates from the Central Committee
until the body could be reorganized “on a basis of true representation.”268
The Trotskyists’ about‐face on Latimer helped smooth over a deep rift
between militants and conservatives in the city labor movement, but the challenge
was how to justify the protest against the Minneapolis FLP to the rank‐and‐file of
the labor movement. The obvious problem was how to convince workers that
backing a known strikebreaker like Latimer and prompting a fissure in the FLP was
Report of the Education Committee, Hennepin County Farmer‐Labor Association,
June 30, 1937, 1, box 1, folder Correspondence and Other Papers, April‐July, 1937,
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in their best interest. To avoid being forced to deepen their public connection to
Latimer or surrender to the Hennepin Central Committee, Local 544 sidestepped the
issue by endorsing Vincent Dunne’s run for mayor on the Socialist Party ticket.269
Even though the Trotskyists had rallied the trade unions against the Central
Committee around the issue of increasing labor’s voice in the FLP, they now urged
organized labor to assume a non‐partisan position in order to avoid worsening the
fracas in the Central Committee. “The turning of the Central Labor Union into a
debating society for the Farmer‐Labor party,” an editorial in the Northwest
Organizer intoned, “is a real crime against the labor movement.”270 The Trotskyists’
new political position laid the basis for an unlikely alliance of the State Federation of
Labor, right wing Farmer‐Laborites, and the anti‐Stalinist left. How exactly this
rather clumsy politicking could compel the FLP to guarantee greater political power
for the trade unions remained unclear.
The revolt of the trade unions was an embarrassment for Benson who found
himself unable to restore party unity. Still stinging from the rump convention’s
accusations of Communist penetration into the Hennepin Central Committee, the
FLP needed to find a candidate for mayor who was in no way tied to either
faction.271 Benson reached out to the head of the state’s pension board and former
All‐American football player Kenneth Haycraft. At the reconvened regular
convention the Central Committee pledged its full support to the Haycraft campaign
“V.R. Dunne Files For City Mayor,” Northwest Organizer, April 22, 1937, 3. The
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and reprimanded the “outlaw” convention’s endorsement of Latimer.272 The battle
between the rival mayoral candidates now spread into the ward clubs, effectively
paralyzing the ability of the Minneapolis FLP’s grassroots campaign network to
promote a candidate.273 In the primary each candidate received roughly 25,000
votes, with Haycraft edging out Latimer by only 236 votes in the final tally.
However, in comparison to the 50,000 votes won by Republican nominee George
Leach, the FLP was in a seriously fractured state going into the general election.274
Rather than attempt to appease the Latimer faction, Haycraft’s campaign defiantly
called the sitting mayor the “crown prince of reaction.”275 Latimer and the trade
unions begrudgingly endorsed Haycraft, but the mayor and his allies in the labor
movement waited until almost the eve of the election to publically urge workers to
perform their “duty” at the polls.276
Haycraft lost the election by almost 18,000 votes while still carrying seven of
Minneapolis’ 13 wards in a race where overall voter turnout rose by 6 percent. 277
Despite the vicious internal feuding the FLP managed to retain its majority on the
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city council, but the actual number of workers who voted Farmer‐Labor dwindled.
Bourgeois voters solidified their opposition to the FLP and an increasing number of
the lower middle and working classes also turned out for the Republicans. Leach’s
chief bastion of support came from the city’s affluent Eighth and Thirteenth Wards,
the so‐called “silk stocking” districts, where he drew almost 19,000 votes alone.278
Politically, Leach was an outright conservative, but his campaign slogan
“Independent, Non‐Partisan, Progressive,” sought to place him above the divisive
party conflicts and class politics that marred the FLP campaign.279 Leach certainly
benefited from the interparty strife and the GOP made real advances in FLP
strongholds. In the city’s working‐class Third Ward, for instance, Haycraft out‐
polled Leach by only 1,200 votes, while two years earlier Latimer (with the
enthusiastic endorsement of the unions) beat his Republican challenger by over
5,000 votes.280 This performance marked a serious reversal of fortune when
compared to the November gubernatorial election in which Benson beat his
Republican challenger by over 10,000 votes in the same ward.281 In the more
socioeconomically mixed wards that Haycraft won, he did so by much narrower
margins than those achieved by Latimer in 1935 and nowhere close to those of
Benson’s in 1936.282
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While the primary feud no doubt helped to dent Haycraft’s numbers, the
labor politics at the core of the dispute demonstrated the class polarization evident
in the election results. The broad appeal of working‐class politics marshaled so
effectively by the FLP in 1936 was significantly narrowed to reflect the specific
political interests of trade union leadership during the battle over control of the
Hennepin County Central Committee. In a postelection report, the Popular Front‐
aligned and Communist‐chaired Hennepin County Educational Committee argued
that the urban petit bourgeoisie voted Republican because the split organized by the
“reactionary” Latimer forces fatally undercut the ability of the “progressive”
Hennepin Farmer‐Laborites to lead an effective cross‐class coalition.283 Although
conservative Farmer‐Laborites like Latimer and his supporters in the craft union
leadership stood in stark ideological opposition to the Trotskyists, their unlikely
coalition was nonetheless based on an appeal to workers as a class. The Trotskyist
and Latimer forces structured their opposition to the Popular Front bloc as an
aggressive maneuver to assert the primacy of organized labor’s politics in the
Minneapolis Farmer‐Labor Party. The resulting electoral defeat was an illustration
of what Adam Przeworski identifies as the “permanent tension between the narrow
interests of unions and the broader interests of parties.”284 Historically labor
politics are not intrinsically exclusionary, but parties and unions must articulate
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those politics to be of immediate interest to other social classes in order to win
electoral support.285
In the public imagination, the revolt of the trade unions against the Central
Committee effectively branded the FLP as either a “workers” party in the narrowest
sense or a hive of Communism subversion. The trade unionists failed to convince
voters that their struggle with the FLP was more than a fight over party influence,
but in fact a worthwhile battle over preserving the voice of working people in party
affairs. The Republican campaign eagerly capitalized on the vicious infighting in the
Hennepin County Central Committee and Leach courted voters uneasy with the
radicalism of the FLP by highlighting the class antagonism that animated the inner‐
party turmoil. To complicate matters further, the disputes fracturing of the FLP’s
1936 coalition spilled over directly into a politically motivated jurisdictional dispute
between the AFL and the nascent Minnesota CIO.

Labor Factionalism in Minneapolis
The debacle of the mayoral election made Benson increasingly excited by the
political opportunities of allying with the CIO to combat opposition from the AFL
and the Trotskyists. He hoped that the explosive national growth of the CIO would
carry over into Minnesota to supplant the AFL and infuse the state labor movement
with a renewed commitment to progressive political action on his terms. The
governor enthusiastically supported the CIO’s organizing campaigns in the mines
and logging camps of northern Minnesota, meatpacking in Saint Paul and small rural
Gøsta Esping‐Andersen, Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to
Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 8.
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communities, at Ford’s Twin Cities Assembly Plant, and in the Minneapolis textile,
machine assembly, and electrical shops.286 For its part, CIO reached out to a sizeable
swath of workers, most of whom lived and worked outside the state’s metropolitan
center, unrepresented by the State Federation of Labor, to build the basis for a rival
labor organization. Ideologically the CIO’s social democratic tendencies gelled
neatly with those held by the FLP’s leftwing and Benson also saw the great potential
of harnessing the CIO’s political machinery to the FLP. The governor pledged
himself to the industrial union movement and shaped his labor legislation agenda
around its needs. The centerpiece was a proposal for the creation of a state‐level
Wagner Act to augment federal provisions protecting the right of workers to
organize and bargain that was identical to legislation endorsed by the CIO across the
industrial north.287
Benson’s sympathies for the CIO and close working relationship with the CP
reintroduced the corrosive element of labor factionalism to the Minneapolis labor
movement. At first the CIO’s movement into Minnesota was of little consequence
because none of its organizing drives, often in industries violently opposed to
unions like mining and timber, won any significant victories. Nonetheless, the
state’s craft union leaders defended the AFL’s hard‐line stance against the CIO.
George Lawson of the State Federation of Labor claimed that the suspension of the
CIO was not a repudiation of industrial unionism, but a censure of the Committee’s
“organizational methods,” specifically the targeting of workers already organized
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 126.
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into craft unions.288 To assuage the AFL, the CIO stated that its efforts in Minnesota
were solely to “organize the unorganized” and not to raid craft unions.289
Nevertheless, Minnesota labor leaders in 1937 complied with the national
leadership of the AFL and barred the CIO from the State Federation of Labor and
from the Minneapolis CLU.290
Although the industrial union upsurge was an ideal entry point for the
Communists already ensconced in the FLP to build a genuine base in the unions,
party activity only further aggravated ideological tensions in the labor movement.
In August of 1937, the state committee of the Minnesota Communist Party “openly
[declared] its full support to the historic work of the CIO,” and pledged its members
and resources to strengthen organizing drives across the state.291 Although John L.
Lewis could cynically claim the Communists he recruited to organize CIO unions
were simply his functionaries, such insouciance neglects the wider impact of the
tumultuous ideological struggles spawned by the presence of Communist
unionists.292 The CP’s move into the CIO directly antagonized the AFL unions that
only months earlier revolted against Benson’s Popular Front allies in control of the
Hennepin County FLP. Benson awkwardly waded into this open‐ended conflict by
announcing himself as a “labor governor” unwilling to be dragged into the quagmire
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of the AFL‐CIO controversy.293 The Trotskyists and the State Federation of Labor
interpreted Communist‐led CIO organizing drives as an intrusion into their rightful
jurisdictions and an attempt to sap their political clout.
Labor factionalism flared into open conflict in September 1937 when
Communist unionists in three Minneapolis IAM locals led 5,000 machinists into two
newly established locals of the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (UE).
Like the Trotskyists in Local 544, the CP cadres in the machinist locals eschewed
hard‐line revolutionary rhetoric in favor of militant industrial unionism and clashed
repeatedly with the conservative national IAM leadership while earning the respect
of the rank‐and‐file. Moving the machinists into the CIO and the Communist‐led UE
gave the Minnesota CP its first genuine foothold in the Minneapolis labor movement.
The Minneapolis machine shops became the center of the new statewide Industrial
Union Council, linking the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) campaign
on the Mesabi Iron Range with newly formed locals representing meatpacking
workers in southern Minnesota.294 Led by executive officers who were all
Communists or at least sympathetic to the Popular Front, the Minnesota CIO
effectively became an organ of the CP.295 The defection to the UE also moved a
number of Communist machinists into influential positions in the Hennepin County
Farmer‐Labor apparatuses. The “capture” of the machinists provided the leftwing
Hennepin Farmer‐Laborites with a trade union base to counter the Trotskyist‐State
Federation of Labor alliance in interparty clashes. Nevertheless, the state CIO was
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only a fraction of the size of the State Federation of Labor in Minneapolis and across
the state. Given the forward momentum of CIO unions across the country, the FLP’s
Popular Front bloc was confident that the Industrial Union Council could easily out‐
organize the State Federation of Labor.
At the helm of the most powerful union in Minneapolis, if not the state, the
Trotskyist teamsters feared that any Stalinist inroads into the labor movement via
the CIO would curtail the political power of the AFL in the FLP. Their response to
the IAM local’s defection was emblematic of a deepening alliance with the State
Federation of Labor. Predictably, the Trotskyists lashed out at the “irresponsible
leadership” of the Stalinist for undermining the labor unity that made the growth of
the IAM locals possible.296 They considered the raid on the machinist locals little
more than a naked grab for political power by the Communist Party.297 “We repeat,”
the leaders of Local 544 announced, “the Minneapolis crisis is not a CIO question,
not an industrial union question. This is the question: Is the Minneapolis labor
movement to be split up and clubbed into the dirt, all for the purpose of feeding the
appetites of the self‐seeking Stalinist clique?”298 The CLU came out in support of the
few hundred machinists who remained in AFL locals and condemned the “trickery”
of the Communists for blatantly raiding established locals.299 The Trotskyists put
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the point more bluntly in saying the Minnesota CIO “declared war on the rest of the
union movement.”300
As the competing factions in the labor movement grew more intransigent,
Benson foundered as a peacemaker. Delegates to the 1937 State Federation of
Labor Convention in September put forward 13 resolutions calling for labor unity,
but continued AFL hostility to the CIO also evident on the convention floor. In a
pointed reference to the CIO’s reliance on NLRB elections to win union recognition,
State Federation President T.E. Cunningham reasserted the AFL’s anti‐statism and
snidely remarked, “The right of organization of working men is not granted by legal
action.”301 On the convention floor Farrell Dobbs spoke in favor of industrial
unionism while denouncing the CIO’s ties to Stalinism and penchant for “labor
splitting.”302 In his speech to the convention, Benson implored the labor movement
to resolve its internal controversies and to restore labor unity in order to avoid the
fates that befell the German and Italian labor movements.303 Although the
governor’s address was greeted with applause, Representative John Bernard, the
Farmer‐Labor congressman who represented the Iron Range, was prevented from
speaking because of his work as an organizer for SWOC.304 After the convention
Benson struggled to repair the rift in labor’s ranks and for his efforts won fresh
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scorn from the labor movement. He personally met with 75 business agents and
labor officials from the AFL in the state senate chambers who dismissed outright the
governor’s pleas to enter peace negotiations with the CIO.305
The tense atmosphere in the Minneapolis labor movement was only
exacerbated by the assassination of Teamsters Joint Council chair Patrick Corcoran
outside his home on the night of November 17. Corcoran’s death became a
flashpoint in the AFL‐CIO crisis as both sides’ concocted stories involving the Soviet
secret police and gangsters to smear their opposition. Corcoran’s own funeral
nearly devolved into a bloody showdown before an armed man and alleged CIO
representative was removed.306 The violent death of a leading AFL union official in
the midst of a contentious jurisdictional dispute should have convinced Benson to
act the impartial arbiter, but again he proved unwilling or unable to transcend his
pro‐CIO sympathies. In a letter to Tobin, Dobbs noted, “There seems to be
considerable hesitancy on the part of the administrative forces to really delve into
this case on an energetic basis.”307 With no arrests or strong leads the investigation
ground to halt and wild accusations swirled, stoking animosity between the State
Federation of Labor and the CIO and their Farmer‐Labor allies. Publically, the labor
movement was tainted with an unsavory connection to murder, with the implication
of gangsterism and corruption as the presumed motive. Similarly, Benson and the
FLP appeared either as accomplices in a cover‐up or radical provocateurs unable to
“Business Agents Tell Benson of Machinist Split,” Northwest Organizer, October 1,
1937, 1.
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maintain law and order.308
Minnesota’s labor governor was actively contributing to the factionalism
eating away at his party as national economic crisis struck at the gains made by
organized labor. In this worsening atmosphere, Benson reiterated the dangers of
discord in the labor movement for the FLP. “Our opponents,” Benson explained to
the Ramsey County Farmer‐Labor Association convention, “seek by every means
they can grasp to break up our movement, to make it small, narrow, divided,
sectarian, exclusive‐ and ineffective.”309 But the governor’s own behavior
exacerbated the sharp organizational and ideological divisions pitting organized
labor against itself. His unyielding loyalty to the Communist bloc in the FLP sparked
one nearly catastrophic revolt during the Latimer‐Haycraft primary and his
preferential treatment of the CIO was set to ignite another. To make matters worse,
these political rifts in the labor movement coincided with the crippling outbreak of
an economic recession. Workers fought desperately to protect their gains in the
workplace, but from the spring of 1937 until the outbreak of World War Two the
labor movement were squarely on the defensive.310 1937 was a militant year as the
number of strikes more than doubled nationally as employers seized an opportunity
to flout national labor law and violently resist the gains won by unions.311 The
recession hit the industrial unions especially hard and the militant march of the CIO
Gieske, Minnesota FarmerLaborism, 253.
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310 Melvyn Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 137‐38.
311 Florence Peterson, “Review of Strikes in the United States,” Monthly Labor
Review, 46 (5) 1938, 1066.
308
309

108

ground to a halt. As a divided organized labor movement dug in for a protracted
fight with capital, a conservative coalition was taking shape in Congress against an
embattled Roosevelt administration. In Minnesota, as elsewhere in the industrial
North, labor factionalism undermined the political effectiveness of organized labor
as well as the broad appeal of working‐class politics.

The Contested Terrain of Liberalism
Despite the multifaceted divisions in the Farmer‐Labor Party in the labor
movement, this period marked an ascendance of working‐class politics. Militant
labor coalesced around a broad‐based Farmer‐Labor movement to substantively
reshape the political environment of Minnesota. This process took place alongside
similar transformations across the industrial north with the New Deal Democrats.
Although the labor movement was divided, trade unions and working‐class politics
were responsible for the momentous political realignment behind New Deal
liberalism. The leftward drift of national politics in 1936 was by no means
uncontested, but scholars have almost exclusively framed opposition to the New
Deal in starkly reactionary terms. Regularly overlooked is the history of influential
segments of the Republican Party in northern industrial states that accepted the
New Deal as the bedrock of a new political reality in the United States. The prewar
resurgence of a liberal GOP was nonetheless founded on a sharp critique of the New
Deal’s incipient social democratic tendencies and a clear desire to curb the strides
made by urban industrial workers and their politically mobilized trade unions. In
short, the intertwined insurgency of organized labor and the triumph of New Deal
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class politics belied a subtle, yet deeply significant, conflict over the shape and
direction of mid‐twentieth century liberalism.
Recent scholarship highlights the limits of New Deal liberalism as the result
of internal struggle within the Democratic Party and the difficulties for American
political institutions and culture to embrace more dynamic reform regimes.
Reactionary Southern Democrats are routinely cited as the primary impediment to
the vaguely social democratic aspirations of the New Deal. “The South,” Sean
Farhang and Ira Katznelson argue, “possessed a structural veto over all New Deal
and Fair Deal legislation at a time when Republicans alone could not sustain an
effective opposition.”312 The “Southern veto” of Southern Democrats to legislation
promoting labor organization and national economic planning delimited organized
labor’s political integration into the state, thereby forestalling a transition from
liberalism to social democracy.313 In addition to placating the racist and reactionary
Bourbons of the party, New Deal reformers relented in the face of mounting
business opposition. Following the 1937 recession and especially during the Second
World War, New Deal elites, Alan Brinkley argues, underwent a “confused and
contentious process of adjustment” to reach an accord with corporate business
autonomy.314 David Plotke is less convinced that reformers surrendered to capital
to the extent that Brinkely contends, but maintains that the New Deal order itself
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lacked the ideological and institutional capacities to become a social democratic
political order.315 Nick Salvatore and Jefferson Cowie go even further and dismiss
the New Deal as a “historical aberration” that could not overcome America’s diverse
and divisive racial, ethnic, and religious background nor reconcile itself with the
individualism at the center of American political culture.316
The basic insight of these varying interpretations is that the New Deal was a
composite political order of competing social elements. Although basically correct,
this summation relies on three assumptions: that the New Deal was incapable of
social democracy, that the defining moment of conflict was the 1940s, and that
Republican opposition by the late 1930s was resolutely anti‐New Deal. However, a
closer and more nuanced look at the industrial North requires two correctives to
these assumptions. One emphasizes the tenuous nature of the New Deal’s electoral
coalition. The other follows Brinkley’s timetable but moves the critical period of
conflict to 1937‐1938, in particular the defeat of New Dealers during the mid‐term
election season. As Alan Ware points out, even though the Democrats appeared to
be the national “majority coalition,” the party never actually established a stable
majority. “Marginal” northern urban voters, including many erstwhile Republicans,
were consistently lured by the initiatives of the New Deal in the economic crisis, but
never permanently embraced it.317 The dislocations of the Depression allowed the
Democrats to take advantage of the crisis to pass legislation far beyond what a
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national majority might otherwise have consented to.318 Yet, the powerful new
coalition that emerged in 1936 was, as the Roosevelt administration soon
discovered, difficult to control and unify.319 The Depression did not hand American
politics over to the Democrats, but it did dramatically reshape the political terrain of
the industrial North and made New Deal liberalism a broadly appealing idea. Given
the strength and fragility of the Democratic majority in the north, it is essential to
consider also the shape of opposition to New Deal liberalism.
To better understand the opposition to the New Deal requires reevaluating
the resurgence of the Republican Party in the late 1930s. Scholars have struggled to
situate conservatism in a period of so‐called liberal consensus in large part because
the general thrust of these accounts emphasizes the rise of an explicitly anti‐New
Deal rightwing.320 This means broadening urban politics, the “revolt of the city” in
the 1930s described by Samuel Lubell, to include a more diverse array of
oppositional voices.321 The standard history contends that the Republican Party
“sought to ‘conserve’ an America which they believed existed before 1933.” Their
opposition to the New Deal, historian James Patterson claims, initially took place on
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a wide spectrum extending from the very moderate to the reactionary before the
Republicans became a resolutely anti‐New Deal minority party in response to
Roosevelt’s leftward turn in 1936.322 This newfound coherence was achieved,
historian Clyde Weed argues, because the party’s eastern elite successfully drove
out any moderate or liberal dissenting voices.323 The party’s lingering Progressive
wing in the west either sided with the Democrats or hardened into vocal opponents
of the New Deal because of their profound distrust of centralized state power and
interest group bartering.324 This analysis of the reconciliation of an east‐west GOP
schism under conservative colors gravely ignores urban Republicans in eastern and
western states like Minnesota, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin who blended
a desire for liberal reform with a conservative critique of New Deal class politics.
Such urban Republicans found a natural constituency in those marginal voters who
supported the New Deal, but remained skeptical of an increasingly powerful New
Deal state underpinned by a politicized labor movement. By 1938, the tenets of
liberal Republicanism appeared very persuasive to a wide range of urban voters.
Across the country an embattled Roosevelt administration and a divided
labor movement left the Democrats weak and vulnerable in the very northern urban
industrial centers that had become their key bastions of support. At the apex of its
power the progressive, even radical, base of the New Deal in the labor movement
was fraying just as elite reformers were beginning to seriously doubt the efficacy of
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social Keynesian policy. The outbreak of what quickly became known as the
“Roosevelt Recession” made clear that the New Deal had not ended the Depression
and threw into question the underpinnings of social Keynesian economic theory.
Roosevelt’s proposed reorganization of the Supreme Court in early 1937 enraged
his opponents and unnerved many supporters who saw an executive overreaching
his constitutional authority. In addition, resurgent labor militancy, sparked by the
sit‐down strikes in the rubber and auto plants and the countervailing brunt of
violent employer repression especially among the “Little Steel” firms, posed two
interrelated problems for New Dealers. If the New Deal labor relations regime could
not secure industrial peace, then government sanctioned collective bargaining was
doomed. Similarly, attempts by workers to meet repression with more aggressive
strike activity underscored the powerlessness of the New Deal state. Labor strife
exposed the very usefulness and legitimacy of New Deal politics to close and
unflattering scrutiny. By 1937‐1938, the Republicans had a choice to either lead a
frontal assault on the New Deal or colonize it by co‐opting its most popular
components.
Remarkably, the Minnesota Republican Party’s response to the flagging
fortunes of the FLP and the New Deal was to co‐opt much of its reform agenda and
jettison its own strident conservatism. This was by no means a gradual evolution in
party thinking, but the outcome of a power struggle between the party’s
archconservative “old guard” and a new generation of activists. Following Leach’s
election in the summer of 1937, the Minnesota Leader excitedly reported a
developing fissure in the state GOP. On one side was a caucus of hard‐line
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conservatives, unswerving in their opposition to the FLP and the New Deal, who
called themselves the Committee for Republican Action. On the other, the Young
Republican League of Hennepin County warned that the party was falling into the
hands of a clique of “Fascists.”325 Led by an ambitious and hardworking young
county attorney named Harold Stassen, the Young Republicans wanted to shed the
party’s unpopular image as agents of reaction and big business. In 1934, as violent
class conflict raged on the streets of Minneapolis, Stassen was elected chairman of
the Young Republicans and declared, “we favor the beginning of a political party
from which will be excluded those selfish interests which seek to use wealth of
extensive corporate holdings as the key to improper influence; a party which will
present an aggressive, intelligent and fair minded opposition to those now in
office.”326 The liberal movement led by Stassen, political scientist Ivan Hinderaker
wrote, was to be a “revitalizing” force in the Republican Party that recognized the
new set of economic, social, and political factors reshaping daily life. Stassen and his
followers consciously wanted to build upon the reforms begun by the FLP and New
Deal Democrats while tempering their radical implications.327
The unique political background of his St. Paul upbringing deeply informed
Stassen’s brand of liberalism. Growing up a Republican in Irish Catholic St. Paul, the
Democratic Party’s lone Minnesota stronghold, impressed upon Stassen the value of
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honing an eclectic political platform to appeal to a diverse electorate. His close
friend and law partner, conservative Democrat Elmer Ryan, a budding politician
who was elected to the US Congress in 1934, helped guide Stassen’s early forays into
St. Paul politics. His links to the Democrats also reflected his own ideological
sympathy for labor. Stassen touted his working‐class background in the city’s
stockyard neighborhoods and proudly announced his two brothers’ as members of
AFL unions. The rise of the FLP and the crisis of the Depression further influenced
Stassen’s liberal Republicanism as Dakota County District Attorney, a position
formerly held by Floyd Olson. In 1933 he ingratiated himself to both the Olson
administration by prosecuting the South St. Paul Armour packinghouse for
blacklisting striking workers and the AFL by helping to discredit the strike’s
Communist leadership.328 In addition, Stassen made a name for himself during the
packinghouse strike and the experience was decisive in shaping his critical
liberalism. Later campaign literature outlined how “[h]e conferred daily with the
strike leaders” and convinced the strikers to repudiate the “outside communists
[who] attempted to incite violence and prevent arbitration.”329 He was a
“Republican who praised the American Federation of Labor,” but he rejected
voluntarism in favor of strict legislation to resolve labor disputes and drastically
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limit the ability of workers to strike.330 Despite accepting the legitimate role of
trade unions in a modern economy, Stassen’s solid commitment to using the state to
curtail the ability of unions to act as autonomous agents of working‐class power
defined the authenticity of his Republican credentials.
In late 1937 and early 1938, the GOP struggled to find a nominee to challenge
Benson for the governorship two years after the FLP landslide. Stassen’s name
came up as a potential sacrificial lamb for the party even though many in the
Republican establishment found him far too liberal. He surged ahead in a crowded
field of established conservative candidates (including Mayor Leach) and won the
nomination in a primary election that witnessed the number of Republican votes
increase by 25 percent.331 Stassen defined his campaign as a struggle against the
twin forces of reaction and radicalism, thereby redefining the Minnesota GOP as a
liberal party. The GOP’s gubernatorial candidate described the party’s new liberal
direction in an announcement to campaign volunteers: “You are enrolled in a
crusade to drive racketeering, radicalism, masquerading under a liberal label, out of
our state Capitol, and to replace it with a truly liberal, constructive
administration.”332 Stassen put forward a thoroughly New Deal‐influenced platform
that included support for the 1935 Social Security Act and the need to increase the
purchasing power of workers. Key to this liberal reinvention of the Republican
Party was his avowed support for the rights of organized labor. “We shall never
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permit the National Guardsmen’s bayonets to be used as an employer’s weapon to
crush those who labor,” Stassen announced. “Neither shall we give to the
irresponsible leftwing of the labor the support of the state government in its
attempt to undermine the sound labor movement.”333 His position was designed to
resonate with the conservative, pure‐and‐simple politics of the AFL while
denouncing militant and politically active unions like Local 544 and those in the CIO.
Stassen’s emphasis on labor politics was a calculated effort to break apart the FLP’s
increasingly unstable urban coalition by highlighting the source of intraparty
tension in the FLP.

FarmerLaborism in Crisis
The rise of a liberal faction in the state GOP acutely exacerbated the growing
conflict in the FLP. With the feud over the Minneapolis mayoral nomination fresh in
mind, the party’s left and right wings dug in for a bitter primary campaign as
conservative Farmer‐Laborite Hjalmar Petersen once again challenged Benson for
the governorship. Petersen was encouraged to run by the party’s rightwing who
were appalled by Benson’s Popular Front administration. He also drew
considerable support from influential Republicans and business leaders convinced
that a moderate Farmer‐Laborite stood a better chance of being elected than a
member of their own party.334 Among Benson supporters Petersen was excoriated
as a closet reactionary, but the leftwing was nonetheless impatient to stifle any
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impression that the party was tearing itself apart.335 Selma Seestrom, the Popular
Front liberal co‐chair of the Hennepin County Central Committee, argued that there
was no division in the Farmer‐Labor movement between a left and right wing, only a
struggle “between the rank and file and a small clique who want control of the
[Farmer‐Labor] Association.”336
That clique included the Trotskyists, Latimer, and the State Federation of
Labor who were tentatively rallying behind Petersen as a way to increase the trade
unions’ political influence in the FLP. In a discussion with Trotsky in Mexico City in
April 1938, James Cannon laid out the political situation facing the trade unions:
The Stalinists who have been driven out of the trade unions have penetrated
deeply into the Farmer‐Labor Association—this constitutes a weapon against
us in the unions. The policy there now is the policy of a bloc of the Trotskyist
unions with what they call the “real farmer‐laborites,” that is, reformists who
believe in the FLP and don’t wish the Stalinists to control it. How far can we
carry such a bloc—how far can we fight for just organizational control? But if
our people stand aside, the Stalinists get control. On the other hand, if we
fight really energetically, as we do in the unions, we become champions of
the FLP. It is not a simple question—it’s very easy for people to get lost in
the reformist policy.337
Trotsky urged the Minneapolis faction not to abandon the FLP, but to continue
working to transform it into an outright labor party.338 However, the Trotskyists’
attempt to translate support for Petersen into a move towards converting the FLP
into a labor party only generated a backlash among the union rank‐and‐file.339 A
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group called the Organized Teamster Farmer‐Labor Committee circulated a
pamphlet throughout Local 544 condemning the Trotskyist leadership for
supporting “reactionaries” like Latimer and Petersen. “We drivers are Farmer‐
Laborites,” the committee’s secretary Douglas Raze wrote, “We demand that [the
Trotskyists], as representatives of our union… give full support to the Farmer‐Labor
administration.”340 In addition, the Trotskyist‐led “unity committee” failed to secure
the votes needed to dislodge the Popular Front bloc from the leadership of the
Hennepin Central Committee.341 Under pressure from the union rank‐and‐file and
stymied in its efforts to win control over the machinery of the Minneapolis Farmer‐
Labor establishment, the Trotskyists and the State Federation of Labor could do
little to chart an independent political path and reluctantly moved to back Benson
against Petersen.342
Dispirited by the craft unions’ decision, Petersen opted not to attend the FLP
state convention in March. The convention proceedings, held in the CIO stronghold
of Duluth (no less), very quickly disillusioned the few AFL unions that did send
delegations to the Farmer‐Labor conclave. Eager to neutralize a conservative
uprising, Benson presented a much more moderate platform to the assembled
delegates. Gone were the party’s exhortations of “production for use” as well as
planks calling for socialized medicine and public ownership of utilities and natural
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resources.343 In response to a year of debilitating infighting Benson attempted to
placate both factions by paring back the FLP’s social democratic aspirations until the
party’s reform agenda looked almost identical to that of the New Deal. The FLP
pledged to protect the right of labor to organize and bargain collectively, to adopt a
state‐fund workmen’s compensation law, a state wage and hour bill, and a state
labor relations act patterned on the NLRA. Nonetheless, a banner prominently
displayed at the front of the convention hall reading “BUILD A FARMER‐LABOR
BULWARK AGAINST FASCSIM” was a pointed reminder of Benson’s Popular Front
orientation.344
For the Trotskyists and other trade unionists, the state convention proved a
dismal reminder of the FLP’s slack commitment to labor and working‐class politics.
Frank Tighe of the Hennepin County delegation noted, “Look on the platform and I
don’t think you will find it is over‐crowded with trade unionists.” “Don’t forget,”
Tighe admonished the convention, “that the foundation of the F‐L Party rests
nevertheless upon the economic organization of the trade unions as well as the farm
organizations.”345 Organized labor felt itself ignored and marginalized as nearly all
of its demands were struck down while a raft of Communist front groups and paper
organizations seized control of the convention to advance Benson’s moderate new
program. Led by delegates from the Minneapolis Building Trades Council, the State
Federation of Labor even threatened to withdraw from the convention. “Militant
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Minnesota labor,” the leaders of Local 544 sighed, seemed only to hold any sway
with the FLP when it threatened to walk away from the convention with its
members in tow.346
As an attempt to restore party unity the convention proved a dismal failure.
In the summer of 1938 both the left and right wings prepared for a fierce
gubernatorial primary. Petersen focused his campaign on rooting out the “Reds”
who had seized control of the Benson administration.347 Otherwise sympathetic
party officials and affiliated organizations were embarrassed by his incessant
emphasis on Communist infiltration. They reluctantly sided with Benson in hopes of
putting an end to party infighting that was focusing unwanted public attention on
the very real presence of Communists in the FLP. An infuriated Petersen took these
defections as proof of Communist domination and his attacks on Benson and his
inner circle, dubbed the “Mexican Generals,” increasingly combined red‐baiting with
anti‐Semitic attacks on the governor’s supporters.348 As Petersen lost support
among the FLP establishment, he appealed to Republicans by calling for a return to
the FLP’s “liberal roots” and away from the “pale‐pink liberalism” of the Popular
Front.349 Unsure of Stassen’s electability, Republicans inundated the Farmer‐Labor
primary to nominate Petersen and ensure that the general election would be a
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contest between moderate conservatives.350 Benson only narrowly defeated
Petersen in a highly competitive primary election, but the governor’s paltry 16,000‐
vote plurality fell far short of an expected margin of 50,000.351 Benson’s win was
purely a pyrrhic victory. His strongest showing was on the Iron Range where SWOC
was organizing iron ore miners, but the outspoken support of the CIO undermined
the FLP’s conscious effort to downplay its image as the party of militant industrial
workers. In contrast, Petersen’s dissident campaign galvanized a growing
conservative coalition against Benson that now shifted its support Stassen.
Benson’s campaign for reelection clamored to reignite the same sense of
urgency that animated the 1936 election by repeatedly connecting the FLP to the
New Deal. As one piece of campaign literature loudly exclaimed: “MINNESOTA
UNDER GOVERNOR BENSON IS TODAY THE NO. 1 NEW DEAL STATE OF THE
UNION.”352 By 1938, the New Deal had lost much of its luster and its coalition was
unraveling, but the FLP continued to identify itself with the Democrats. The Benson
campaign focused on repairing the FLP’s crumbling relationship with organized
labor while articulating the broad social benefits of a strong labor movement. The
campaign deliberately underscored how much had changed for organized labor
since the trucking strikes of 1934 by sharply reminding workers of the vital role
played by the state in mediating industrial disputes. “Do you control the absolute
right to and power to organize and bargain collectively?” asked one campaign
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pamphlet. “The Labor Movement of our state and nation has a keen interest in
government… [b]ecause government plays such an important part in our lives we
must of necessity be interested in those who administer governmental functions.”353
The Benson campaign was careful to describe the New Deal labor relations regime
as beneficial for all segments of society, not strictly organized workers. In
Minnesota, the Farmer‐Labor platform declared, there were “thousands of
organized and unorganized workers, whose buying power must be protected if the
rest of our citizens are to thrive.” Increasing the purchasing power of workers by
supporting unionization was a boon for everyone‐ producers and consumers,
workers and capitalists‐ in the “stores, shops, and factories.”354 Protecting labor’s
right to organize and collectively bargain was essential to reviving the economy and
restoring social stability in a state that had become synonymous with labor strife.
Stassen’s campaign also emphasized labor policy, even as his platform
expounded the virtues of an “enlightened capitalism” that relied on the state to
restrain working‐class power. In speech to the Young Republican League of
Minnesota, a party activist remarked: “While labor has made great strides during
the past decade, it now faces a serious situation in Minnesota, because of the
manner in which the present administration has become inoculated with ultra‐
radicalism and communistic tendencies.”355 Throughout the campaign Stassen
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developed a labor policy that advocated increased state intervention to control
militant labor and unscrupulous capital. In a typical campaign speech, Stassen
excitedly described the threat of unchecked class conflict:
The flames of industrial warfare constitute one of the most serious threats to
future progress, to social security, to the maintenance of our democratic
government. The grasping reactionaries and the vicious radicals are the twin
stokers who feed these destructive flames. The one, the reactionary, refuses
to recognize the rights of workers to organize as he chooses…. They destroy
much of the efforts of the great majority of employers who do recognize their
duty to society and to their employees and who do promote the industrial
peace. The other, the radical, fosters and promotes premature strikes,
encourages unnecessary violence and law violations, develops a disrespect
for public authority, uses the labor movement as a screen for communistic
activities, ruthlessly splits asunder the great labor movement of the nation
and undermines and destroys much that has been accomplished by the
sincere, constructive leaders of the labor movement.356
The fatal flaw of the Wagner Act, Stassen complained, was that it “made no
provisions for the settlement of disputes when collective bargaining failed.”357 He
called for a “progressive labor relations act” to “[do] away with the caveman tactics
of premature strikes, lock‐outs, and violence” by legislating strict guidelines for
labor organizing and protest.358 His proposed labor policy hinged on the assumption
that labor, not capital, was at fault for creating social discord. If the state could
restrain worker militancy, then employers would be persuaded to bargain in good
faith with organizations of their workers’ choosing. This policy was grounded in a
fundamental hostility to the process of politicized collective bargaining ushered in
by the Wagner Act. Stassen conceded that workers had a right to form unions, but
Stassen speech notes, no date (ca. 1938), box 5, folder 1938 Gubernatorial
Campaign‐ Speech Material, Stassen Papers.
357 Hinderaker, “Harold Stassen and Developments in the Republican Party in
Minnesota,” 90.
358 Stassen speech notes, Stassen Papers.
356

125

he radically reinterpreted the spirit of the New Deal labor relations regime to
reassert the state as a check on working‐class power.
Stassen ridiculed the political empowerment of organized labor engendered
by the New Deal. He eagerly played up the split in the labor movement, and like
Republicans across the country he attacked the CIO’s militancy and political
aspirations; he even went so far as to instruct campaign volunteers to publicize an
alleged remark by Benson that “Minnesota is a CIO state.”359 But in Minnesota the
CIO remained weak. It was unions like Local 544 in Minneapolis that were the real
targets of Stassen’s labor policy.360 In his keynote address to the Republican state
convention he stated, “Our administration will respect the trade union movement as
an economic movement and will not seek to make of it a political vehicle.”361
Stassen conjured up the non‐partisanship of the AFL by arguing that the only
acceptable place for organized labor in a democratic society was as a bargaining
agent for job‐conscious workers. He shrewdly quoted a member of an IAM local
gutted by the raiding of the UE in a campaign letter to underscore the failure of New
Deal labor policy to revive the economy. “He’s for a labor relations law that will
prevent most of the lockouts and walkouts which are costing us more and more in

Stassen campaign memo, no date (ca. 1938), box 4, folder Gubernatorial
Campaign‐ Misc. Correspondence and Related Papers, Stassen Papers.
360 Curiously, Stassen refrained from explicitly singling out the Trotskyists in
campaign speeches and literature. Perhaps he did not understand their sectarian
rift with the Stalinists, but more likely he did not want to offend the State Federation
of Labor by reminding them of their inability to purge the radical leaders of
Minneapolis’ most powerful union.
361 Harold Stassen, Keynote Speech at the Republican State Convention, September
2, 1938, box 4, folder 1938 Gubernatorial Campaign‐ Misc. Correspondence and
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lost time and putting more and more of us on the relief and WPA rolls.”362 The
insurgent Republicanism portrayed strikes as an impediment to economic recovery
for employers, employees, and the state, rather than a legitimate instrument for
working people to redress their grievances. Stassen contended that what workers
wanted from their unions was industrial peace, not political activism propagated by
“communistic” elements. He also pointedly dredged up the memory of a nasty
jurisdictional fight to remind workers affiliated with the State Federation of Labor
where Benson’s real sympathies lay.
Stassen’s studied effort to cultivate a liberal image was supplemented by an
archconservative shadow campaign to demonize the FLP through extensive red‐
baiting intertwined with vitriolic outbursts of anti‐Semitism. As a result there were
two Republican campaigns for governor: one was filled with admiration for the New
Deal, and the other was shot through with fascistic and xenophobic language and
imagery.363 Republicans picked up the thread of anti‐Semitism left over from
Petersen’s primary campaign to assail Benson. Despite Stassen’s liberal pretensions
and claims that he did not endorse such tactics, the tenor of the Republican attacks
on the FLP can best be summed up in one Stassen campaign song:
Hi ho, hi ho
We join the CIO
We pay our dues
To the goddamn Jews
Hi ho, ho.364
Stassen campaign letter, no date (ca. 1938), box 4, folder Gubernatorial
Campaign‐ Misc. Correspondence and Related Papers, Stassen Papers.
363 Hyman Berman, “Political Anti‐Semitism in Minnesota during the Great
Depression,” Jewish Social Studies 38 (3) 1976. 260‐61.
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Republican politician and fascist sympathizer Ray P. Chase popularized these
sentiments in his widely distributed anti‐FLP screed Are They Communists or
Catspaws? Subtitled a “Red Baiting Article,” the scurrilous pamphlet reached some
13,000 homes and was disseminated to leading Lutheran and Catholic figures across
the state.365 In it the FLP was painted as a facade for the insidious forces of
international Communism and Jewry.366 Chase’s pamphlet featured crude, Nazi‐
inspired anti‐Semitic caricatures of four of Benson’s advisors as commissars of
Bolshevik tyranny. Referred to as the Mexican generals by Petersen during the
primary battle, the epithet stuck and conjured up an image of a clique of foreign
revolutionaries conspiring against the supposedly “forgotten men” of Minnesota
(i.e., gentile Scandinavians and Germans).367 While Stassen never stooped to anti‐
Semitism, neither did he bridle supporters like Chase whose conflation of red‐
baiting and anti‐Semitism proved highly effective.368 The net result made the 1938
Minnesota gubernatorial election, in historian Jeffrey Gurock’s estimation, “the most
successful use of political anti‐Semitism in the United States.”369
Although the FLP again attempted to rally voters against a fascistic assault on
progressive reform, this year the momentum was on the side of the Republicans.
A.I. Harris, one of the governor’s advisors singled out in Chase’s hate literature,
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compared the “fake liberalism” of the GOP to National Socialism’s subversive
appropriation of working‐class politics.370 Red‐baiting and “phony liberalism” were
symptomatic of the ideological bankruptcy of the Republican campaign, but also the
danger of reaction masking its true intentions with progressive platitudes.371
Homegrown fascism and the GOP were conspiring together, the FLP reported,
because the leader of the Minnesota branch of the Silver Shirts announced he was
backing Stassen.372 In response to unceasing red‐baiting Benson distanced himself
from the Popular Front and urged his Communist allies to keep quiet during the
election. He declared himself and the FLP the only true liberals in the race. “The
aim of liberal government,” he stated in a campaign speech, “[is to] aid people in
today’s efforts to liberate themselves from want and insecurity. Today, any political
leader who fails to recognize the danger of this new industrial and commercial
feudalism cannot qualify for liberal leadership.”373 Benson defended his pro‐labor
record and compared himself to Michigan Governor Frank Murphy who refused to
use troops against the sit‐down strikers at GM’s Flint plants.374 Yet his labor
platform was limited to pleas for increased wages and shorter hours, and aside from
a CIO‐backed proposal for a state‐level Wagner Act, the governor offered no specific
policies for addressing the economic crisis. Despite adopting a carbon copy of the
New Deal, Benson enjoyed little support from Democratic leaders. Still reeling from
“Fake Liberalism Forerunner of Fascism,” Minnesota Leader, April 23, 1938, 4.
“Republican Smoke Screen Fails,” Minnesota Leader, October 22, 1938, 1, 7.
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the failure of his so‐called purge of anti‐New Deal Democrats, Roosevelt did not
actively campaign for Benson and kept silent through almost the entire campaign.
The president did not even endorse Benson until a week before the election, offering
only generic praise for the governor’s “efforts to develop liberal governmental
policies.”375 Unlike in 1936, the Democratic Party was in disarray and its popularity
was flagging. Yet Benson and the FLP continued to identify their campaign with that
of the Democrats.
As the election drew nearer, the FLP nervously tried to mitigate the impact of
continued labor factionalism. A handful of local elections across the country
foreshadowed political fallout of a split in labor’s ranks. In Seattle the Washington
Commonwealth Federation, a non‐partisan farmer‐labor group working within the
state Democratic Party, was torn apart by the dueling AFL and CIO unions. The CIO
unions backed the Commonwealth Federation’s liberal mayoral candidate, while the
craft unions opted to back a conservative Democrat.376 Closer to home, St. Paul fell
to the Republicans despite the FLP’s decision to support the city’s Democratic
machine and not run any candidates in the municipal elections.377 In a letter to
Benson, Vincent Dunne explained: “The present program of the FLP is one which can
scarcely inspire the workers and farmers to close ranks and conduct the stubborn
fight which is necessary for victory.” The defeats in St. Paul, Dunne warned,
presaged trouble for the general election because there was little “difference in the
“Benson Named Liberal Choice by Roosevelt,” Minnesota Leader, November 5,
1938, 1, 3.
376 “AFL‐CIO Warfare Defeats Labor in Seattle Mayoralty Campaign,” Minnesota
Leader, April 9, 1938, 4.
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class character” of either candidates or their programs.378 The Trotskyists remained
ambivalent about the FLP and hostile to Benson’s New Deal‐oriented Popular Front
administration because, they argued, Farmer‐Laborism was forfeiting workers’
interests in order to win over the urban middle‐classes. In a plea for labor unity, the
Minnesota Leader ran an editorial outlining the steep costs of factionalism. “There is
the threat that the [labor] movement may be broken up into dis‐unified fragments,
with some of those fragments even listening to labor’s enemies from the ranks of
private monopoly. There is also the siren voice of the new Republicanism, which
hopes to win back the good will of the workingmen whom it betrayed, by covering
the claws of reaction with the soft phrases of Republican ‘yes, but’ liberalism.”379 US
Congressman John Bernard laid out the political repercussions of the rupture in
labor’s ranks in blunt terms. In elections where the AFL and the CIO divide their
support among competing candidates, “thousands of middle class and professional
people, the logical supporters of progress, become distrustful of both labor
candidates and throw their votes to the reactionary whom everybody has forgotten
to expose. The A.F. of L. man is defeated, the C.I.O. man is defeated, and a company
stooge wins hands down.”380
Class politics, not labor unity, was the real problem. Even though the labor
movement was officially united behind Benson and the FLP, rank‐and‐file workers
did not “turn out in full force” during either the St. Paul or gubernatorial primary
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elections.381 Local 544 announced its support of the entire FLP slate, but advocated
an alternative, yet vague, “militant program” to the official party program.382 As
partisans in the internal struggles dividing the FLP, the Trotskyists failed to take
seriously the political ramifications of labor factionalism. Local 544 and the other
AFL unions in Minneapolis consistently refused to reintegrate the CIO into the
institutions of the city labor movement. When Selma Seestrom put forward a
proposal that the Minnesota Industrial Union Council jointly decide upon candidate
endorsement with the CLU and the Hennepin County Central Committee, the
proposal was quickly shot down for giving the much smaller CIO unions equal
representation with the AFL rivals.383 Joe Van Nordstrand, organizational director
of the Industrial Union Council, accused the leadership of Local 544 of staging
“political strikes” at state cooperative creameries to “foment sentiment” against
Benson and the CIO.384 Although both factions officially supported Benson, the
ceaseless maneuvering and jockeying for power in the Hennepin County Central
Committee and CLU proved self‐defeating at the ballot box. The rank‐and‐file was
fatigued by months of senseless infighting and factionalism. As the election neared,
the trade unions, the FLP’s vital base of urban support, were in disarray and
disillusioned.

Letter from Dunne to Benson, Dobbs Papers.
“Militant FLP Resolution Passed,” Northwest Organizer, November 3, 1938, 1.
383 “CLU, F‐L Committees To Meet,” Northwest Organizer, August 4, 1938, 4.
384 Recommendation of the Minnesota State Industrial Union Council on Methods of
Cooperation with the Working Farmers, no date (ca. 1939), Mss 848, box 15, folder
13, Dobbs Papers.
381
382

132

Backlash
The FLP was defeated as spectacularly as it was brought into office two years
earlier. Benson was buried in a landslide by nearly 300,000 votes. In out‐state rural
counties the governor was handily beaten, but the biggest reversal was in Hennepin
County where Stassen won by close to 50,000 votes.385 In Minneapolis the
polarization of the city’s voters demonstrated in the 1937 was repeated in the
generational race. Benson won a mere 6,500 votes out of almost 40,000 total votes
cast in the bourgeois Eighth and Thirteenth Wards. Most distressing for the FLP,
though, was the continued decline of Farmer‐Labor support in working‐class wards.
In 1936 Benson trounced his Republican challenger in the laboring Third, Sixth, and
Ninth Wards. Two years later, he barely won these solid working‐class districts as
overall voter turnout in fell by fully 15 percent.386 The governor’s race was the
centerpiece of the statewide collapse of the FLP. In the Twin Cities, on the Iron
Range, and in the small towns and farms, a resurgent Republican Party drove almost
the entire Farmer‐Labor ticket from office.
In an editorial forum for The Nation entitled “Why We Lost” featuring Philip
La Follette and Frank Murphy, Benson concluded that the defeat stemmed from a
number of factors including red‐baiting, anti‐Semitism, and divisions in the
organized labor movement. The cumulative effect was to produce “confusion in the
minds of farmers and ‘white‐collar’ sections of our city population as to what the
sharpening labor issues were all about” after two years worth of conservative
White, et al., Minnesota Votes, 196‐97.
County general election recapitulation, November 10, 1938, Hennepin County
Elections Office.
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propaganda upbraiding Farmer‐Laborites and New Dealers for waging a “class war”
in Congress and state legislatures.387 The Republican victory led many to ask, “Did
the people vote against the New Deal?” No, Benson surmised, because the victorious
Republicans in Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin all vowed to continue to protect
the basic reforms of the New Deal (i.e., legal protection for collective bargaining,
social security legislation, unemployment insurance, and farm subsidies). The
people did not vote down the New Deal, they voted in a party that promised to fulfill
the New Deal better, but this promise was at odds with the Republican Party’s core
interests. “Today’s streamlined conservatives and ‘New Dealized’ Republicans have
promised two things: (1) To rebuild our crumbing economic foundations; (2) to do
so without dislodging the financial and industrial oligarchy which now stands
between the people and their full use of the economic, social, and political
institutions of their country. The two promises contradict each other.” Benson took
solace in this contradiction and predicted that the people would return to
progressive politics “earlier than many of us expect.”388
The Republican victory, though, was much broader than Benson realized.
GOP rode to victory across the industrial North and Midwest, unseating New Deal
and third‐party politicians by embracing a liberalized platform. In Michigan, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania, “the workshop of America,” Republicans were elected over
staunchly pro‐labor New Deal candidates. The GOP elected 17 new governors, 12
previously held by Democrats and 2 by third parties. In the US Senate and House of
Philip F. La Follette, Elmer A. Benson, and Frank Murphy, “Why We Lost,” The
Nation, December 3, 1938, 587.
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Representatives, the Republicans picked up 23 and 81 seats respectively. According
to Clyde Weed, the Republicans elected in 1938 “accepted the broad outlines of New
Deal,” but remained staunchly conservative and committed to blocking any further
leftward drift in social and economic policy.389 This explanation, as Benson’s
editorial argues, obscures the significant ideological concessions made by
Republicans to accommodate even the broad outlines of the New Deal. The defeat of
progressive New Dealers sympathetic to some kind of social democratic reform
steered the Democrats in a more conservative direction. This move, though, was
heavily influenced by liberal Republicans’ embrace of the basic thrust of the New
Deal. New Dealized Republicans helped to the pioneer the fiscal Keynesianism that
shaped the political economy of the New Deal order from the 1940s onward. This
“peculiarly American brand of Keynesian economics,” as political scientists Karen
Orren and Stephen Skowronek describe, “represented a distillation of the terms
under which liberalism’s new social priorities could accommodate southern,
corporate, and labor power.”390 The elections of 1938 did not signify the end of
liberalism. On the contrary, the elections established the enduring terms and
boundaries of the New Deal order. The Republican resurgence in 1938 convinced
the Democratic Party perhaps once and for all to delimit its commitment to class
politics and retrench its social policy initiatives.
The split in the labor movement that fully emerged in 1938 fatally
undermined the very social movement most capable of mustering a campaign for
Weed, The Nemesis of Reform, 201.
Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, “Regime Building in American
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(4) 1998‐99, 701.
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more extensive social and economic reform. The case of the Minneapolis labor
movement underscored how political divisions begat organizational divisions that
prevented organized labor from consolidating the impressive gains won in the 1936
elections. The political differences between the CIO and AFL were not unique to the
mid‐to‐late 1930s. The ongoing debate over the worth of voluntarism and non‐
partisanship were deep‐seated, reinforcing a parochial and narrow‐minded
approach to politics that became all the more self‐defeating as the labor movement
emerged as a national social movement. Yet the crisis of the Depression and the
experimental nature of the New Deal opened the space for organized labor to
mobilize not only its greatly expanded constituency, but also other social classes
behind a political agenda that addressed the structural deficiencies of capitalism.
Even during the tenuous period of unity in 1935 and 1936, the labor movement was
able to push the Democratic Party to identify itself and the New Deal with working‐
class politics. Something resembling social democratic reform was within organized
labor’s grasp before 1938, but not after, because both Democrats and Republicans
reached a tacit compromise to rein in a movement that the latter considered too
radical and the former too divisive.
Despite the setback of a Republican victory, both the FLP and the Trotskyists
interpreted the defeats of 1938 as concrete evidence of a substantive shift at the
base of the national political culture. Not content to accept the limitations of the
New Deal status quo, voters turned to the Republicans, now preaching a liberal
sermon, because there was no real political alternative. The people wanted change,
the FLP reasoned, but remained confused about what kinds of changes would be
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necessary to end the economic crisis of the Depression.391 The Trotskyists argued
that the election went to the Republicans because of the New Deal’s inability to
articulate a new message that explicitly acknowledged the contradictions of
capitalist society. “Throughout the northern strip of states the New Dealers were
ruthlessly rejected and expelled from office” because voters could find no real
differences in the Democrats or their third party allies like the FLP.392 Nonetheless,
a liberal consensus had been won by the struggles of economically and politically
organized working people. These struggles imbued working people with the
confidence to demand better treatment at work and a government more responsive
to their needs. To win again in America’s workshop, the FLP and the Trotskyists
agreed, the Republican Party would need to prove its liberal credentials.
Historically, though, the result was liberal retrenchment.

Conclusion
The 1938‐midterm elections became a critical moment to test the durability
of the New Deal order, its coalition, and its ideological limits. On a national level, the
case of the Minneapolis teamsters was emblematic of a widespread backlash against
the New Deal and the politicized labor movement that energized its left‐leaning
tendencies. The defeat of New Dealers in the industrial North was accompanied by
the mortal wounding of their third party allies like the FLP. Labor won access to
political power because of its militancy and militancy in turn helped to undermine
“Beyond the New Deal,” Minnesota Leader, November 12, 1938, 3.
“Why Workers and Farmers Voted Republican,” Northwest Organizer, November
17, 1938, 2.
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its great strides by the end of the 1930s. Labor’s political clout was not weakened
because of militancy in and of itself. Labor militancy was not an infantile outburst,
as Roosevelt suggested after the Flint sit‐down strikes. Nor was it a wholly self‐
defeating electoral stance that isolated workers as a class from other social classes.
Labor militancy provided the basis for a national movement to cohere around local
and regional experiences of class conflict that linked shop floor struggles with
political activism and real gains in public policy. What the Trotskyist teamsters and
others in the labor movement failed to articulate was a message that consistently
connected the struggle of workers with those of other social classes. The ruinous
effect of factionalism only amplified organized labor’s political isolation.
The elections also witnessed the rise of a new, redefined GOP. The moderate
and liberal Republicans who assumed power in 1938 recognized that the political
landscape of the North was markedly different from the one they confronted a
decade earlier. The basic thrust of New Deal reform‐ the need for some degree of
state intervention in the economy, some social welfare legislation, and the
legitimacy of organized labor’s rights‐ proved popular. These Republicans
recognized the changing political tenor of the times and adapted by conceding an
important ideological point by recognizing the legality of unions. However, these
Republicans retained a marked hostility to any challenge to the supremacy of capital
and continued to follow the path charted by conservative Democrats.
The New Deal’s social democratic potential, embodied in the “moral
preeminence” of the labor question and the organizational upheaval of militant
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organized labor, was blunted decisively in 1938.393 The defeats of the 1938
elections crystallized the schisms that stymied organized labor’s very ability to
mobilize politically for sweeping social change. Organized labor held a vaunted
position in terms of prestige and political relevance as a mass, class‐conscious
movement in the 1930s and effectively reshaped the political order for next several
decades. Yet this movement was highly unstable and composed of powerful but
combustible elements that quickly fractured the emerging national labor movement
by the mid‐1930s.
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CHAPTER 5
EPILOGUE

The debacle of the November elections left the Farmer‐Labor Party reeling
and months later still bitterly divided over who or what was responsible for such a
disaster. At a March 1939 meeting of the Hennepin County Farmer‐Labor
Association, the party’s left and right factions angrily conducted an electoral
postmortem. The right wing, comprised mainly of trade unionists, blamed the
Communists in Benson’s Popular Front administration for ignoring the interests and
demands of organized labor. Benson’s campaign, one delegate argued, made no
effort to reach out to the unions for policy input in order to “get any locals lined up”
behind the governor. “The unions don’t give a damn who is in control politically,”
another labor representative declared, “but they do want to do everything they can
to better the conditions of the unions.” The Popular Front left wing retorted that it
was labor’s narrow focus on the interests of the unions that drove away crucial
middle‐class and rural voters and cost the FLP the election. It was the Trotskyists,
they claimed, who were fomenting division in the county organization to destroy the
Farmer‐Labor Party once and for all.394 Both factions could agree that Farmer‐
Laborism and liberal reform in general was at a crossroads, but neither quite
understood just how sharply the future of reform had contracted.
On the one hand, this debate over the role of class in electoral politics
Minutes of the Hennepin County Farmer‐Labor Association, March 22, 1939, box
2, folder Minutes of the Hennepin County Farmer‐Labor Association, March 22,
1939, Stageberg Papers.
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underscored just how much Minnesota and national politics had changed over the
last decade. The crisis of the Depression certainly contributed to the rapid
ascendance of the Farmer‐Labor Party in 1930, but it was the organization of urban
workers that ensured the party’s continued electoral success. The trucking strikes
of 1934 made collective bargaining a reality for workers in the city’s bustling
transportation and distribution economy and the following two years extended the
reach of unions into other Minneapolis industries. Labor militancy revitalized the
labor movement and remade it into a social movement of working people capable of
reshaping city and state politics. Therefore, in Minnesota and elsewhere, the
political achievements of the New Deal were not solely the product of Roosevelt and
the executive branch. As David Brody writes, “The public men who carried labor’s
fight occupied state houses, mayors’ offices and congressional seats, and what they
did on behalf of labor they did independently of the New Deal administration.”395 At
the local and state level, the FLP‐ like New Deal Democrats‐ responded to the
upsurge in labor militancy and the dislocations of the Depression by placing
working‐class demands for greater economic regulation and social welfare policies
at the center of a large new reform coalition. The elections of 1936 represented the
apogee of labor‐centric reform politics, but this new coalition’s durability was
strained by the class politics at its core.
Although organized labor substantially redefined the contours of New Deal
liberalism, labor’s class politics also contributed to the sharp contraction of the New
Deal’s social democratic potential. Building a broad cross‐class coalition was the
395
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highest priority of New Dealers and Farmer‐Laborites. Examining the 1938 election
returns convinced even pro‐labor New Dealers that whatever electoral edge the
unions provided candidates could also induce a backlash against the specific class
interests of organized workers. Labor factionalism contributed decisively to this
perception as competing unions focused their political influence on securing
jurisdictional authority over particular crafts and industries. In Minnesota the
divisions within the labor movement were complicated by sectarian tensions
between the Trotskyist teamsters and Popular Front Communists as both groups
struggled to win influence in the Farmer‐Labor Party. Both the Trotskyists and the
Communists believed in reformist electoral politics; the point of contention was
whether the FLP should advance its social democratic platform as a progressive
cross‐class entity or an outright labor party. As the mid‐term elections neared, the
various factions in the labor movement and the FLP could find little common ground
on which to rally popular support, much less push for more sweeping reform.
The vaunted coalition of 1936 was in tatters, but the appeal of New Deal
liberalism was not so easily diminished. The liberalism of Stassen and other New
Dealized Republicans simply embraced the “essential conservatism” of the New
Deal.396 The eclectic and experimental reforms of the New Deal were intended only
to rationalize capitalism’s most glaring deficiencies and inequalities.397 It was the
politicization of the labor movement that pressured New Deal Democrats to
undertake more substantive reform, but as the movement fragmented so too did the
Brody, Workers in Industrial America, 107.
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Democrats. As a mass social democratic party the FLP was even more susceptible to
the debilitating effects of labor factionalism. Into the breach stepped a new
generation of Republicans who understood the need for reform, but could not abide
by the class politics of a militant labor movement. They made common cause with
liberal reform, but balked at the social democracy advanced by certain segments of
the labor movement. The liberal Republican onslaught of 1938 convinced the
Democrats to delimit their reform agenda. Divided, the progressive wing of the
labor movement could do little to influence the Democrat’s party policy. The unions
of the CIO as well as those of the AFL entrenched themselves as competing interest
groups in the wider constellation of Democratic politics.
The defeats of 1938 destroyed the FLP along with other third parties that
presented a more radical alternative to the New Deal. In 1944, the party’s remnants
merged with the Democrats to create the Democratic Farmer‐Labor Party (DFL).398
For the next decade this amalgam of Democrats and Farmer‐Laborites foundered at
the polls. During this time, the state Republicans under Stassen and his successors
continued to embrace liberalism while consciously working to expunge the radical
heritage of Farmer‐Laborism and the militancy of the Trotskyists. In 1939, the state
legislature passed the Minnesota Labor Relations Act that severely curtailed
workers’ ability to strike‐ it would become the model for the Taft‐Hartley Act of
1947. Then in June of 1941, only months before the US entered the Second World
War, the Stassen administration, in conjunction with the FBI and Daniel Tobin of the
IBT, helped to orchestrate the arrest of Local 544’s Trotskyist leadership on charges
Cf. Jennifer Delton, Making Minnesota Liberal: Civil Rights and the Transformation
of the Democratic Party (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 12‐19.

398

143

of sedition and the union was put into receivership. In Minnesota, the forces of
liberalism outflanked and repressed radicalism.
From 1934 to 1938, the very shape of liberal reform was actively contested
and workers and their interests stood at the center of this debate. It was working‐
class politics, ushered in by insurgent militancy and then galvanized into a robust, if
fractious, coalition at the polls. What drove this nascent coalition was a dynamic
impulse for social reform that substantively changed people’s lives. Workers won
higher wages and better conditions on the job, but they also discovered their
collective power to reshape politics and to connect their struggles with those of
other social classes. At the apogee of its power, organized labor squandered its
newfound clout in fruitless factional battles and alienated crucial cross‐class allies.
Throughout the war and postwar years, organized labor remained a critical, but
subordinate, component of the liberal coalition.399 The electoral defeats of 1938
brought to a close the moment when organized labor could rightfully claim to be the
lynchpin of American reform politics. It was the local struggles in cities like
Minneapolis that defined the longterm direction of the New Deal order.
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(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).
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